# THE NEW REPUBLIC


## Very, Very Educational

*James Deakin*

## The World of George Kennan

*Louis J. Halle*

## Defense on the New Frontier

*Morton Halperin*

## Berlin, Bizerte, Bowles

*The Editors*


*August 7, 1961, 25 ce*



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# T.R.B. *from Washington*

*Berlin and Sacrifice*

★ We would guess the time-table over Berlin would go something like this: Congress will quickly pass Kennedy's requests for non-nuclear military build-up and there will be a series of phased defense increases. Talk of a new Summit will grow. The West won't want to talk until after the West German election in September; Mr. Khrushchev won't want to talk till after the Communist Party Congress in Moscow in October. The problem will be to manage public tensions till then. Our guess is that Khrushchev will, sure enough, sign a peace treaty with East Germany turning over control of access routes to West Berlin. The West will protect this but will not go to war. Mr. K. will propose a conference over Germany and the West will throw some kind of a counter-punch, say a proposal for a plebiscite on German reunification. Mr. K. will reject this; the West won't move unless access to Berlin is specifically interfered with by East Germany. That will be the rub.

Again and again in his nationwide TV speech Kennedy stressed that the door to negotiation is open. The speech was firm, grim, but low-keyed; he did not call for mobilization nor proclaim a "national emergency" which many had predicted. His proposed military measures did not lead, but followed, Soviet announcements that it would cancel proposed cuts in conventional forces. If there was provocation in the new arms race it came from Moscow. The somber, slowly-delivered Kennedy speech shocked many people into an awareness of what columns like this have been trying to tell them for some time: there is threat of conflict that might escalate into nuclear war. Most Washington officials don't think there will be war; they are sanguine – perhaps too sanguine – that at some point Moscow will back down. Both sides leave the door to negotiation wide open.

The American people wanted to pay higher taxes in the Berlin crisis. They wanted to show their determination; to make sacrifices. They wanted the grandiloquent gesture – not something petty like raising first class mail rates from 4 cents to 5 cents which Kennedy proposes. (Congress probably won't even consider it.)

It took a lot of firmness not to ask for higher taxes in this paradoxical situation. The reason seems even more paradoxical: the Administration wants a bigger deficit. Incredible! Not really. Eisenhower had a deficit of $12.4 billion to pull us out of our last recession (without inflation or collapse of the dollar) and Kennedy was budgeting for a deficit of only about $3.5 billions. Kennedy's economic advisers warned that this would meet the superficial problem (starting recovery) but wouldn't reach the deeper problem (seven percent unemployed).

The Berlin crisis gave the push to raise the deficit to about half of Eisenhower's 1959 deficit, with an almost certain budget surplus for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1963. Inflation? There are five million idle workers and 20 percent idle plant capacity. Inflation may come from the human factor but hardly from scarce goods.

*The Untouchable*

★ If there's one subject mass circulation magazines shy away from it's birth control. Kennedy's "Alliance for Progress" program starts this weekend in Paraguay and *Life* and *Look* have been filled with big, gaudy articles about Latin American problems. All but one problem. It is true that *Life* writer Robert Coughlan mentions "population explosion" and "unfettered procreation" but he drops it there.

Yet the birth rate in Central America is now the highest in the world. It is zooming everywhere in Latin America. United States' foreign aid improves hygiene so death rate declines; births stay high. We all know why birth control is not publicly discussed. It is for fear of offending the Catholic church. Latin America is Catholic. Coughlan writes sympathetically of the Church – in the past it has often seemed a "partner in the very system that produced the exploiters," he says, but now, fortunately, "one is beginning to find priests who speak out. . . ." Not about birth control, however.

On November 26, 1959, the US Catholic hierarchy issued a statement, "Explosion or Backfire?" charging that artificial birth control is "a morally, humanly, psychologically and politically disastrous approach to the population problem." It took cognizance of increasing talk about a population explosion and branded it "the sheerest kind of nonsense" . . . "hysterical terrorism" . . . "bland misrepresentation of data."

The fact is, people are multiplying faster than at any time in history; every year 50 million people – as many as there are in Italy – are added to the world. But we ignore it when we set out to aid Latin America although this is one of the causes for the spreading misery, hunger and radicalism there.

*Outer Mongolia*

★ A delegation from Nationalist China is in town seeing Kennedy and worried lest America abandon its head-in-sand policy to the Far East. All of a sudden we are hearing a good deal about Outer Mongolia. Sen. Styles Bridges (R., N.H.) sees a plot to recognize Outer Mongolia as "a side-door device to make the recognition of Red China a bit easier." The fact is that Outer Mongolia, with its capital Ulan Bator (if you can find it on the map) is a buffer state between Red China and Red Russia. There is no doubt that it is a puppet but nobody knows *whose* puppet. Moscow claims it; Peiping hasn't abandoned it. The United States ought to recognize Outer Mongolia, we think, and get a diplomat there just as fast as possible. It is primitive nonsense that equates diplomatic recognition with moral indorsement. We need, frankly, an observer out there to see what is going on; it seems one of the best places in the world to study the tensions between Moscow and Peiping.

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# Berlin in Perspective

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If the President is able to use the heat generated by the "Berlin crisis" to drive the Congress into strengthening our conventional military forces (thus decreasing dependence on nuclear weapons) and to adopt his proposals on foreign aid, and perhaps even on education, the crisis will have served some constructive purpose. But using the Communist threat as a lever to prod Americans into doing what they should be doing anyway has its perilous side. We may sincerely believe that we are preparing for negotiations and not for war, but we cannot be sure that our display of determination is understood throughout the world, or even in the Kremlin, as we would like. There is the ever-present danger that either we or the Russians will be pushed into going farther than either wishes to go. There are unpredictable, non-rational elements in this inflammable situation that could suddenly transform brinkmanship into a military showdown that is in no one's interest.

Who can be sure, for example, that within the next six months a revolt on the Hungary pattern will not break out in East Germany, led by men who believe that it is now or never and who will call upon their fellow Germans and the United States to redeem our repeated promise that Germany should one day be united and free. Or who can say whether even the President, having fired up the nation's resolve not to be pushed around by the Russians, can dampen down the fires when the time comes for finding peaceful solutions. For the strongest pressures on our leaders are not coming from the advocates of negotiations but from those who yearn to use Berlin to prove that America is still in the ball game ("We never lost a war, did we?").

Let us therefore try to understand as clearly as possible what the Berlin controversy is about. It is about whether at some future date and through ways now unknown, someone, and presumably East German authorities, will attempt to impede traffic to the city from the West. Traffic has not yet been impeded; indeed, Mr. Khrushchev has said that he has no intention of obstructing access. The squeeze on Berlin could be applied, and if it is, appropriate counter-measures will be necessary. But there is a tendency to over-inflate the seriousness of the "threat." And there is a tendency also to confuse preserving the *status quo* in Berlin with whether or not the Russians sign a peace treaty with the East German regime. In itself a treaty would not jeopardize any vital interests of the US. It is not, moreover, a decision over which we have any control. And it is not a test of US prestige, and should not be made to appear so.

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# The Tragedy of Bizerte

Bizerte was a tragedy of errors on the part of three Presidents – Habib Bourguiba, Charles de Gaulle and John F. Kennedy. The Tunisian President made the first and most serious mistake; he lost his head, took the badly-calculated and worse-timed decision to order his soldiers to fire a few shots at French paratroopers; but he was goaded into his error by a sense of betrayal by the French, of whom he had been the best friend in North Africa and the Arab world. The French President ordered or condoned what amounted to a wanton massacre of Tunisians, then let his pride and arrogance make him treat the Secretary General of the United Nations with the same kind of contempt he had shown to Bourguiba. The American President let his concern for cementing a common front in NATO on the Berlin issue cast new doubts on the sincerity of our policy of anticolonialism in Asia and Africa.

Whatever hope there may have been to maintain some French military presence over the years, not only in Bizerte but also in Algeria's Mers el Kebir, probably is gone. France's political standing among the new Afro-Asian nations has fallen steeply, and de Gaulle's greatest single contribution to the West – his policy of moderate de-colonization – is in serious jeopardy.

Unwittingly Washington has conspired with Paris to downgrade the UN and to help Khrushchev in hurting Dag Hammarskjold. Not only has Bourguiba been forced toward President Gamal Abdel Nasser and the Arab League but such pro-Western states as Pakistan and Nigeria have quite predictably lined up with Tunis against Paris and Washington.

How did the first mistake at Bizerte – Bourguiba's – happen, and why?

It was in 1956 that the French Government promised to negotiate its withdrawal from the military base at Bizerte. Four years later, in January, 1960, Bourguiba, tired of waiting, organized a week of demonstrations in favor of French withdrawal, but when parts of the French army rose against de Gaulle in Algeria that month, the demonstrations were at once cancelled. Thirteen months later Bourguiba was received by de Gaulle at Rombouillet. He carefully refrained from pressing the issue of Bizerte, but returned home confident that he had de Gaulle's implied promise to start fulfilling the pledge of 1956.

Instead, the French took steps which indicated that they intended to stay in Bizerte indefinitely. Early in July, almost six months after the meeting at Rambouillet, Bourguiba sent a personal letter to de Gaulle in which he pointed out that he had devoted 30 years of his life to free cooperation between France and Tunisia, but that he had to point out that France's apparent intention to increase its military hold at Bizerte might have serious consequences. Raoul Duval, the French representative in Tunis, and Admiral Amman, commander of the Bizerte base, both suggested a favorable French reply, and the US and British Ambassadors sent a series of reports to the State Department and Foreign Office, confirming that the situation might get out of Bourguiba's personal control. The Quai d'Orsay prepared an extremely conciliatory note to Bourguiba but de Gaulle personally "corrected" it to a cold statement that France would not consent to negotiate under pressure or threat.

Neither London nor Washington took the diplomatic warnings seriously.

Feeling that his moderation was getting him nothing while the Algerians' toughness was bringing them successive advantages, and exposed to the pressure of the neutralists in his own camp, Bourguiba ordered a block-

## *Jean Daniel Wounded*

Jean Daniel, contributor to *The New Republic* and foreign affairs editor of the Paris weekly *L'Express*, was seriously wounded at Bizerte. On Thursday, July 20, he was to have left Tunis with Thomas F. Brady of *The New York Times* and Eugene Mannoni of *Le Monde* to keep an appointment with the commander of the French base at Bizerte. Circumstances delayed him and in order to keep the appointment, he accepted an invitation to ride in the car of the director of the weekly *Afrique-Action*.

Close to the military base, Daniel left the car and walked toward the entrance of the base. He was plainly a civilian; he wore a short-sleeved white shirt; four French soldiers appeared from behind a hill and fired a volley at him. A bullet passed through Daniel's right thigh, then through the left leg, breaking the femur and causing a serious hemorrhage. The soldiers continued to fire while the other men in the car ran out to get him – it took them twenty minutes to get him into the car and start for the Bizerte Hospital, already crowded with wounded, where, without light or water, surgeons were operating day and night.

The next day Daniel was put in the first ambulance of a convoy headed for Tunis. The convoy was stopped by a road block and the ambulance in which Daniel was riding was searched for arms. When it was permitted to continue on its journey, other French soldiers fired at it. No one was hit but in the race to escape the shots, the wounded men were shaken from their stretchers. The only comment by the French military authorities was a statement made by Major Camine, press attaché to the base commander, that "when one becomes a war correspondent, one chooses one's side."



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ade of the base, then the even graver step of firing on French paratroop reinforcements. He told Jean Daniel on the eve of the outbreak that he would not be de Gaulle's "crutch." The French military leaders, frustrated in Algeria and after the long series of reverses going back through Indochina to the collapse of 1940, took out their accumulated resentment on the Tunisians, soldiers and civilians alike; they gave an exhibition of wanton brutality which shocked the world. US Ambassador Walmsley warned the State Department that the time had come for Washington to show that it did not support colonialism. Bourguiba sent a personal message to President Kennedy; his son, Tunisian Ambassador in Washington, pleaded with Dean Rusk for American moral support. But the President, his mind dominated by the needs of the Berlin situation, chose de Gaulle, and London backed up Washington.

When the Security Council of the UN, to which Tunisia appealed, called on both sides to cease fire and to withdraw to the positions they held when the fighting began, the French, whose forces had gone far beyond such positions, refused to withdraw. When Hammarskjold went to Bizerte on Bourguiba's invitation, his bid to go to Paris too was ignored. On his return to New York, he told the Security Council that he had seen with his own eyes French violations of the Council's withdrawal resolution.

Perhaps de Gaulle would, in any event, have brushed aside any advice from President Kennedy, but in the Afro-Asian world the attitude of the White House has put the seal of approval on the insult to Hammarskjold and the UN.

And worse, the language of Paris, in announcing the semi-boycott of the UN – that France "intends to remain the judge of her own security" – has made de Gaulle seem to be echoing Khrushchev.

*"The President Himself Taped It Back On"*

# On the Job at State

Having affirmed at his July 19 press conference his liberty to deploy members of the Kennedy Administration as he sees fit, the President now appears more or less decided on the indefinite continuance of Chester Bowles as Undersecretary of State. The difficulty confronting those who have tried to get Mr. Bowles shifted to another post is that the reasons given for such a move would not be believed. Mr. Bowles may not have the perfect temperament for a second-in-command. He may have been guilty at times of too much verbosity. But however much the requirements of smooth interdepartmental routine preoccupy those within the Administration, the politically conscious public in the US and abroad would find it inconceivable that the removal of Mr. Bowles as Undersecretary was to be explained in terms of administrative efficiency, and would naturally look for the explanation in irreconcilable differences over issues of foreign policy.

In our view, the fact that the Kennedy Administration accommodates at the highest levels a well-advertised diversity of views is a strength, not a weakness, encouraging candor on the part of many an independent soul working at lower bureaucratic levels who might otherwise tailor his recommendations to fit his own advancement. One of the great hopes held out by Mr. Kennedy last year was that contending policy alternatives would regularly find their way to the desk of the President, and that US policy would be made after due consideration of all available expertise. It was for Mr. Kennedy to synthesize differing approaches and to decide how far and how fast he could, in any given instance, reshape US foreign policy. It remained for his Department of State to produce the intellectual grist for the Kennedy mill. If there is any one final impression left from the Bowles affair it is that the dilemma now exposed has less to do with one man than with the profoundly unsettling effort to adapt the encrusted bureaucracy of State to the needs and style of an impatient new Administration.



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# US and AT & T

The partnership policy of the Eisenhower Administration, which meant that the federal government would help private enterprise develop and manage the nation's power resources, has been adopted with refinements in a White House July 24 statement on space communication systems. Following through swiftly, the National Aeronautics and Space Agency announced, three days later, that it would enter into contract with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company for the launching of AT&T's experimental communications satellite, two of which are scheduled to go into orbit before the end of next year. The estimated cost to the government of each launching is $6 million, for which it will later be reimbursed by AT&T; and the company will also turn over to the government all knowledge and patents derived from its experimental work with these satellites. What the government will have invested in this venture is the very heavy cost of developing space rocket technology.

At the same time, the Federal Communications Commission has asked 10 of the principal United States companies in the international communications industry to figure out how much they will be prepared to invest in the establishment of a worldwide space communications system.

Sen. Russell Long (D., La.) is concerned that this may mean the government intends to hand over control "to a very few large corporations whose present position in this field already has been achieved largely through research financed by American taxpayers. . . . Congress has a clear duty to see to it that the field of developing and operating communications satellites is thrown open to the maximum degree of competition." The Senator has called hearings beginning August 2 to inquire further into this matter.

For its part, the NASA says that its agreement with AT&T is limited to a single experimental type of satellite, and it points out that the Federal Communications Commission, not NASA, has the licensing authority. But NASA's administrator, James E. Webb, stands by the principle that satellite communication, as a commercial undertaking, should be in the hands of private enterprise—with the government, where necessary, providing what might be called ground support. This is the view that has been underwritten by Mr. Kennedy's statement of July 24.

The issue some have drawn here is the old one of "public versus private power," not, it is said, much different from the battle over Muscle Shoals, which was waged for two decades before TVA was created, and did not end then. But the analogy is inexact. The old power fight involved a far less experimental technology. There has been no clear cut decision yet, for instance, whether passive reflector space satellite systems (like *Echo*, the big silvery balloon from which radio signals can be bounced back to earth) or active reflector systems will be used. The latter are theoretically far more efficient but can be overloaded, so their utilization must be scheduled rigidly. This is the type of device the government and AT&T have arranged to put into the sky. Simultaneously, NASA plans to launch an experimental satellite of its own, entirely at government cost.

If successful, these space vehicles may make much of the existing privately owned communications industry obsolete. If that happens, who is to pay the damages? The Administration has concluded, apparently, that it would be wiser to give the communications industry a stake in these new systems to avoid the necessity of bailing out, at some future date, the hundreds of thousands of private and institutional investors who own shares in AT&T and similar concerns. And under the Administration policy the government will be able to go on regulating and taxing these companies as usual.

Space communication introduces incredibly complicated international as well as domestic questions: rates, channels, frequencies, cooperation among companies here and connections with foreign communications systems, many of which are nationalized. If, for instance, other countries decide to charge their own customers less for a "space" transoceanic telephone call than is charged here, would they be willing to make the same contributions to the upkeep of the global system? But these potential difficulties are dwarfed by the troubles that could arise between Western countries and the Soviet bloc. Suppose our network programs, radio first (in all probability) and then TV, became audible and visible in the Soviet Union. No matter how carefully the program material might be selected, with every direct reference to Communism deleted, there would still be unending complaint. When that happens it might be advantageous to be able to say that the offending broadcast was an ordinary commercial product.

# Successor to Dulles

The White House, it has been reported, has picked a successor to Allen Dulles as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency. The heir apparent, Fowler Hamilton, had previously refused appointment as Secretary of the Army. He is a 50-year-old Wall Street lawyer, a former Rhodes scholar, with no experience in intelligence work though he has been in and out of public service for 20 years. During the war, he was chief of the enemy branch of the Board of Economic Warfare and specialized in the selection of enemy targets. He has been an effective trial lawyer, is said to be flamboyant, a quick student, a manipulator on a good many



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levels and equipped with a keen analytical mind, abundant energy and integrity. He is from Missouri and beneath the Senatorial flair there is a man who still knows how to talk about grain elevators.

As General Counsel of the subcommittee on the Air Force of the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1956, he worked with Senator Symington and accompanied Symington on a trip to Africa in 1959. Though an early Symington-for-President sympathizer, his was not an active political role; as he explained to friends, "Symington's the only man who has a chance who calls me by my first name." He has a reputation for fairness. Whether he has a deep and comprehensive enough awareness of world politics and will bring that knowledge to bear in locating and tossing out the rotten apples in the CIA barrel (that is, the kind of CIA types who engineered the Cuban invasion) remains to be tested in the months ahead.

At any rate, the President will soon have his own man, a liberal Democrat, someone of force and intellectual competence. The appointment suggests that the Administration, instead of first reorganizing CIA and then finding a man to do the job as redefined, has decided to appoint the man and let the reorganization of the agency come later.

## Some Like it Lukewarm

Major Yuri Gagarin, the Russian space pioneer, received a welcome that sometimes bordered on hysteria when he arrived in London yesterday – *The Times* (London), July 12, 1961.

LONDON – (UPI) – Soviet astronaut Yuri Gagarin flew into London today and received a lukewarm reception from the British government and people – *The Cleveland Press*, July 11, 1961.

# A Scientist Looks at the Berlin Crisis

The violence of the American reaction to the Soviet attempt to change the *status quo* of West Berlin illustrates the fact that no change of political allegiance of any territory in Eastern Europe can be made now without incurring the gravest risk of war. Both sides feel that any such change – be it defection of Hungary from the Eastern bloc, or making West Berlin a "free city" – will endanger their whole power structure in Europe. They are unwilling even to consider any proposed change on its own merits, and are ready to threaten war – whatever the disproportion between the object of the controversy and the likely consequence of a major war in Europe (which, in the case of a war over Berlin, is likely to include obliteration of Berlin itself).

Given this fact – the question arises whether the best policy for the US remains the one adhered to more or less constantly since 1945 – a policy based on expectation of a change in the political allegiance of the countries of Eastern Europe, and aimed at preventing political stabilization of this area. Non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse boundary between Poland and Germany (as well as Soviet absorption of the three Baltic states, a part of East Prussia and a slice of Finland); encouragement of internal rebellion in the so-called "popular democracies," and support of the aspirations of the Federal Republic of Germany to absorb the so-called German Democratic Republic (which is what "reunification" of Germany is bound to mean) – all these policies make sense only within the framework of a political design to keep Eastern Europe in as unsettled a state as possible, in confident expectation that its present allegiance to Communism will come to an end in the foreseeable future. This was the grand hope implicit in John Foster Dulles' policy. Is that the policy of the present Administration?

I do not doubt that a large part of the population of these areas looks forward to a change in their regimes; but can we make this popular feeling the decisive consideration in determining American policies (not merely the political sympathies of Americans) concerning Eastern Europe?

At the time of the Hungarian revolution, we clearly showed that our commitment to the preservation of general peace is stronger – and justly so, in the interest of all mankind, including the nations of Eastern Europe – than our commitment to the liberation of the East European nations from Communist rule.

I submit that the same is true in the case of Berlin. We cannot, without unbearable loss to our self-respect, to our international standing, and to our power position in the world, acquiesce to a sudden or gradual take-over of West Berlin by the Communist bloc; but the maintenance of political and economic freedom of West Berlin is our only binding commitment in this area. We can (without loss other than incurring the displeasure of West Germany) explore the willingness



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of Moscow to agree to the preservation of political and economic freedom of Berlin, in exchange for our recognition of the *status quo* in the rest of Eastern Europe – including all now existing boundaries and political regimes in this area.

I submit that it is at least possible – and even plausible – that the realistic purpose of Mr. Khrushchev in his "Berlin squeeze" is not to initiate a process of absorption of West Berlin into the Soviet sphere and to use it as an opening wedge for the resumption of the Soviet westward march in Europe (as the American people largely believe), but to force the West into recognizing the East German regime and other aspects of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe. We cannot know whether this is so without exploring the possibility. If we should find that the Soviet Union is amenable to an agreement on this basis, I believe it would be in our ultimate interest, as well as that of the peoples of Eastern Europe themselves, to find out how far the Soviet Union would be willing to go in cooperating with us in the general stabilization of the *status quo*, not only in Eastern Europe, but in the world, including, for example, Southeast Asia. Mr. Khrushchev has warned us that this could not include preservation of all existing regimes, however feudal or corrupt they may be, or renunciation of all Communist propaganda and economic "infiltration"; but it could conceivably include effective renunciation (by both sides) of direct military intervention and of the fostering of civil wars by the supply of arms and military organizers; and perhaps also an agreement on gradual pooling of technical aid in a United Nations agency, taking it out of the context of Cold War.

In other words, we should find out whether Soviet world policy is not dominated by the desire – typical of a "have" nation, to keep first of all what it already has – including the interests of its ruling elite in their preservation and security; or whether it is still determined by the drive typical of a "have not" nation to spread its domain, if need be by force, over new areas. If the first is the case, a large-scale accommodation with the Soviet Union on the basis of stabilization of the present power distribution in the world is not unfeasible, and, I submit, the United States should make this stabilization the overall aim of its world policy. If, however, the aggressive drive is the persistent directing force of Soviet world policy, then we have no choice but to continue opposing this policy by all means, including repeated demonstration of our readiness to go to war over every bit of territory threatened by Soviet expansion.

I repeat, we do not know for certain which is the real situation, and we cannot find it out without exploration. One straw in the wind may be Soviet policy in Laos. With a military victory of the faction friendly to the Russians apparently close at hand, the Soviet Union has preferred to such a clear cut victory, negotiations on some kind of neutrality.

In considering the continuation of the present power contest with the Soviet Union, we should be clear in our own minds what such a policy means in our time. As Americans seem to forget only too easily in the heat of the Berlin controversy, realistic power politics have now become impossible. In the past such policies were possible because threats of war were plausible. These threats were the framework within which the power-politics game was played between actual wars. Modern military technology has destroyed this framework; rational – and therefore credible – threats of war have been replaced by threats to abandon all rationality and to release a universal catastrophe of nuclear war for stakes out of rational proportion to the extent of the catastrophe. Without a belief of each side in the likely irrationality of the other, deterrents could not work.

I believe that if, by changing our overall aim in foreign policy from the pursuit of political instability in Eastern Europe to one of political stabilization, this area could be eliminated as a possible source of recurrent war crises, it would be far preferable to "winning" an endless sequence of such crises – each one carrying a considerable danger of exploding into a world war through foolhardiness or miscalculation of one or the other side.

The present Berlin crisis is most likely to end without a war; our demonstration of readiness to start a war over Berlin, however irrational this may be, is not unlikely to prove effective and cause Khrushchev to be satisfied with a face-saving success, such as signing a peace treaty with East Germany without changing the *de facto* status of Berlin. But the risk taken by both sides of brinkmanship is too great to consider taking it again and again.

It is by no means certain that our recognition of the *status quo* in Eastern Europe will stabilize the political situation in this part of the world; it may even liberate some new forces working for greater freedom and greater independence from the Soviet tutelage; but that will be Moscow's problem, with no moral or political responsibility on our side.

More imaginative suggestions have been offered for the establishment of stable peace in Europe, such as the plan for demilitarization of Central Europe. However, all these plans hinge on radical changes in the present set-up; and I am convinced that in the present mood of both the Kremlin and the White House (not to speak of NATO headquarters) all such changes will seem too risky for acceptance by either side.

EUGENE RABINOWITCH

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Professor Rabinowitch *has for many years been editor of* The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.



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A VETERAN SWISS CORRESPONDENT'S REPORT FROM HAVANA

# Cuba's Middle Class

*Havana*

"Havana," the veteran Italian Communist Vittorio Vidali recently exclaimed, "is the most beautiful city of the Socialist World." It is also by far the most elegant and modern. Even the wealthiest and best preserved city east of the Iron Curtain, Prague, is in outward appearance still much the same as it was in the 1930's. Havana has all the markings of mid-century America: neon signs, air-conditioning and refrigeration, supermarkets, cafeterias gleaming with marble and chrome.

Though its beauty is less spectacular, Havana greatly resembles Naples. There are vast residential districts of villas surrounded by luxuriant gardens; there are strikingly designed apartment buildings. Downtown, there are the palm-studded parks and avenues and the narrow streets with their shops. In both cities, there are shabby working-class sections, whole areas of filthy hovels. Yet even the worst of Havana slums are not quite as dismal as some in Naples. And the same applies to the Cuban countryside.

According to the census of 1953, 57 percent of the Cuban population is urban. Cuba's social structure thus does not conform to the widely held view of Latin American society as being composed of a vast mass of peasants ruled and exploited by a tiny minority of feudal landlords. The rural middle-class, it is true, is numerically weak, but in the cities, about 15 to 20 percent of the populace may be said to have had, at the time of Castro's take-over, a living standard, if not an income, approximately as high as that of the average business or professional man in the United States. And the bulk of the numerous lower middle-class, and of the skilled blue-collar workers as well, were certainly no worse off than their counterparts in France and Germany. What is more, organized labor benefited from a highly developed system of social legislation and social insurance which was initiated as far back as the 1930's.

The Cuban middle-class is educated, moreover, and politically articulate. Castro's movement itself was, in its early stages, largely a middle-class revolt. Today the private sector in small and medium industry, in the crafts and in retail trade is still considerably larger in Cuba than in any country of the Soviet bloc, or, for that matter, in Yugoslavia. Both Fidel and his brother Raul have said there will be no further confiscations of private property, and that the revolution will respect the rights and interests of the remaining property-holders in industry, agriculture and trade. And the Communist newspaper *Hoy* some weeks ago sharply criticized those who in their "infantile radicalism" and "negative extremism" want to push the revolution too far.

Yet since it is the stated aim of the government to transform Cuba into a "socialist state" with a planned economy of the Soviet type, it is hardly surprising that the middle-class refuses to be reassured. Every morning hundreds gather in front of the passport office of the Foreign Ministry. The waiting rooms of Western consulates are packed with applicants for visas. Every week Cuban newspapers publish lists of enterprises – many of them small workshops and retail trading firms – which have been abandoned by their owners on leaving the country. The economic damage caused by loss of skilled manpower is considerable, but the government has so far refrained from following the example of the East European regimes in blocking emigration. And wisely so, since emigration is steadily sapping the numerical strength of middle-class resistance.

The emigration movement is by no means confined to property-owners who have suffered or need fear they will suffer confiscation. For it is not only the property-rights of independent businessmen, but the entire way of life of the Cuban middle-class that is being destroyed. Ironically, the economic sanctions of the US have contributed quite as much to this as any Cuban government decree. The middle-class (that is to say, the friends of the United States) are hit harder than anyone else by such measures as the embargo on certain exports and the annulment of the sugar quota. It is more and more difficult to get spare parts for their American automobiles; the importation of foodstuffs has almost ceased; and heretofore well off Cubans are subjected to the novel experience of sharing the simple fare of the common people. It is also being obliged to use cosmetics and clothing of Cuban make which it formerly despised, and even these are in short supply since working class buying power has appreciably increased.

Two recent government decrees have severely wounded middle-class pride. By one of these, the numerous clubs that were the main centers of upper class and middle class society life were confiscated and converted into "Workers' Social Clubs"; their private beaches and swimming pools are now accessible to the general public. This means, as I was told again and again, that "one now has to mingle with Negroes if he wants to go for a swim." The nationalization of the private schools was an even heavier blow.

Pride of caste is a pronounced characteristic of the



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Cuban middle-class. Most Cubans are descended from people who came to the island during the last century, either as settlers from Spain or as slaves from Africa. The history of Cuba has been too short and too much racked by internal dissension to produce the feeling of a common destiny. Even the two terrible wars of independence, 1868-78 and 1895-98, were fought, on the Cuban side, by a strange coalition of Creole landowners with slaves and freedmen, while the Spanish-born middle-class stood apart or collaborated with the colonial power. Thus Cuban patriotism, in spite of the violence of its manifestations, has not been strong enough to create a feeling of brotherhood which could bridge the gulf between classes. Only among the youth of the middle class, and a small minority of its older members, does one encounter a sense of social obligation. And these, who are surely not the worst elements of their class mostly appear still friendly to Castro.

Those of Castro's numerous middle-class opponents whom I have met do not appear ever to have considered that there might be something wrong with their set of values. They are convinced that their way of life was blameless, and that the castastrophe that has overwhelmed them was wholly undeserved. They bitterly resent the suggestion that there might have been serious flaws in the Cuban economy and social structure. According to them, if the Cuban peasant is poor, it is because he is so lazy. If he is illiterate, it is because his parents were too feckless to send him to school. Servants, they say, are accustomed to strict treatment; they would not work and respect their masters if they were treated otherwise. They insist that there is no prejudice against the Negro in Cuba; he is a good fellow if kept in his place. In short, the same clichés that one hears all over the world from those who take their position of privilege for granted and are unable to conceive of anyone's feeling degraded by the social and racial discrimination they inflict upon him. Yet it is the sense of humiliation and degradation that has swung even the upper echelons of Cuba's working class to Castro.

There is, of course, an occasional dissenter and quite a lot of grumbling about the recurrent shortages of basic foodstuffs. Yet the bulk of Castro's supporters would undoubtedly be willing to suffer far greater privation in order to retain those completely unmaterial assets: a new sense of dignity, irrespective of race and social status. In assuming that any shortage of lard and oil, or even of bread, can turn the working-class against Castro, his middle-class opponents seem to me to be displaying the blindness and contempt for their own people which was the cause of their defeat.

ERNST HALPERIN

## HE CAN BE CUT IF HE RUNS – OR IF HE DOESN'T

# Nixon On The Knife's Edge

*San Francisco*

California's drought is now three years old and the Sierra Nevada's reservoirs, which feed the biggest cash crop of any state in the union, are dangerously low. Water, smog, population and urbanization pressures are the problems which daily crowd the desk of the Governor of California. And to Richard Milhous Nixon, who sees himself as the man to deal with Berlin, Laos and Cuba, this must be central to the complex political rationalization in which he is now engaged.

The dilemma confronting Nixon was summed up a few days ago by an astute political reporter who remarked, after passing through San Francisco, that "I talked for an hour with Dick Nixon today and he spent 85 percent of the time telling me reasons why he shouldn't run for governor."

The "shouldn't" nearly turned to "wouldn't" in mid-July when Nixon invited a dozen and a half of his closest California supporters home for a stag dinner and told them he would announce his plans within 30 days. The Republicans persuaded him to hold up any announcement for 60 days, but Nixon left little doubt in their minds that he would not run for governor.

He is "fully oriented to national and international affairs," reports one party leader who was at the stag. "His eyes light up when he's talking about Washington." Moreover, he thinks running for governor might preclude the 1964 nomination even if he won. Assuming that he were elected he would have to spend most of his time in Sacramento running a state with the biggest budget ($2.6 billion) of any state in the union, and with a Democrat-dominated legislature which will be even more Democratic as a result of this year's reapportionment. He would, in short, have to devote himself to the dull, technical problems of statehouse life epitomized in too little water in the right places and too many autos in the wrong places.



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The prospect that Nixon might lose to incumbent Edmund G. "Pat" Brown is taken seriously in the Nixon camp. At the moment California straw polls point the other way, showing that Nixon would enjoy a comfortable lead over Brown. But the polls also show that ex-Gov. Goodwin J. Knight would defeat Brown and that the lesser candidates, San Francisco Mayor George Christopher, Assemblyman Joe Shell or ex.-Lt. Gov. Harold Powers, would give Brown a good contest.

Nixon is too experienced a politician to put much faith in polls – especially "inspired" polls – taken 15 months before an election. He is mightily aware of the edge incumbency gives a candidate, of the fact that he carried his native state last fall by only 35,623 votes out of 6,483,821 cast, and of the walloping registration bulge, more than 4 to 3, which any California Democrat enjoys in a statewide election.

He is cognizant also of the new political dictum that the Senate, not the statehouse, is the path to the Presidency. Therefore, the outward signs point to Nixon's by-passing the gubernatorial race, maintaining his national GOP contacts and continuing his speeches and writings from all available platforms. Nixon is already writing 10 long newspaper pieces over the period of a year for Norman Chandler's *Los Angeles Times-Mirror* Syndicate, which has been successful in pre-selling them at extraordinarily high prices. He is writing a book on six notable crises in his political life (the Alger Hiss case, his 1952 campaign fund controversy, Dwight D. Eisenhower's 1955 heart attack and other illnesses, his stoning in Caracas in 1957, his kitchen confrontation of Nikita Khrushchev and the 1960 campaign). He is preparing to go to Asia for *Look* Magazine in late fall. He is making at least one major trip monthly to places like New York and Texas to give fund-raising speeches for the Republican Party. All of this, he calculates, can build up to a major 1963-64 push for his party's Presidential nomination, possibly without entering any primaries.

This is the tidy way to do it, and Nixon is a tidy man. The trouble is (and he is bitterly aware of it) that a course which might lead to nomination might not lead to election against a man he could not defeat when that man did not have the advantage of incumbency.

By following this course Nixon would be gambling on a major disaster befalling the Kennedy Administration – another misfire of the Cuba variety, if not worse, or possibly an economic downturn somewhat milder than the one which unhorsed Herbert Hoover. In this gamble Nixon must bear in mind that a major disaster can't be *too* major or the electorate would then be disposed to ride out the crisis with the Administration. Thus, even the alternative Nixon is most likely to choose seems unpromising. He knows this, too.

The California party leaders – men like State Chairman John Krehbiel, National Committeeman Joseph Martin, ex-National Campaign Chairman Bob Finch and money-bags Ed Valentine, Nick Hellman and Bob Hornby are continuing to insist that Nixon must run for governor. They argue that he is indisputably the state GOP's only strong candidate, for, despite the polls, no one really believes that retreads like Knight or Powers, or Johnnies-Come-Lately like Christopher or Shell can upset the powerfully entrenched and canny Catholic governor. If Nixon refuses to run, they say, the state GOP would be in for a blood-letting that would make the 1958 Knowland-Knight struggle look like a Sunday school picnic. Their clincher is that failure to run would be tantamount to conceding the state to the Democrats, not just in 1962 but also in 1964, when 38 electoral votes will be at stake – in other words, abdication of national party leadership.

Does Nixon have other alternatives?

He could run for the Senate next year. Alben Barkley returned to the Senate after serving as Vice President. But the difficulty here is that California's senior Senator, Republican Thomas Kuchel, comes up for re-election next year and he would have to be re-routed.

A second alternative focuses on Democrat Clair Engle whose Senate seat comes up in 1964. The theory is that Nixon would stay out of the 1962 gubernatorial race, though he would endorse a man and try his best to get the GOP slate elected. He would size up his chances for the Presidency in 1964 and, if they didn't look good, he would let Gov. Nelson Rockefeller and Sen. Barry Goldwater kill each other off while he breezed into the Senate. Nixon probably could win a statewide race against Engle, for Engle is from the cow country at the northern end of the state and is highly unpopular with the Democratic Party's regulars today. Then, the theory continues, Nixon would have clear sailing to the 1968 nomination; with Rockefeller and Goldwater having butchered each other, he would emerge as the Great Moderate. In 1968 he would not have to face an incumbent.

The third alternative also centers on 1968: run for and win the governorship next year, pass up 1964 and take his best shot for the Presidency in 1968.

In this welter of political speculation it is, perhaps, too easy to overlook the Nixon personality. The ex-Vice President is a hard, resourceful, resilient man who has been on the edge of decision before. Even his detractors in California – and there are many, dating back to his first Congressional campaign against Jerry Voorhees and his first Senatorial campaign against Helen Gahagan Douglas – do not underrate him. His admirers are just as numerous, dating back to the same campaigns. And they feel that somehow he'll slip off the knife's edge.

William Steif



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# Kefauver and the Swindlers

Nobody has found in this quarter anything resembling blind partisanship in favor of the Hon. Estes Kefauver, Senator from Tennessee. His perennial aspiration for higher office has been viewed from this angle with a lack-lustre eye, and so have many of his ideas.

But the trend of events is forcing a change of attitude in at least one superficial observer. Today Kefauver is hated by every thief in the United States; and most venomously by the pious banditti who claim that they pick our pockets *pro humanitate et gloria Dei*. Which inclines one to adopt the slogan that Governor Bragg gave the Cleveland Democrats: "We love him for the enemies he has made."

The glorious part of it is that every arrant rogue who spits blasphemies at the very mention of Kefauver has ample reason for his rage. It is astonishing what a variety of rapscallions this one investigator has exposed. Purveyors of rotten foodstuffs; manufacturers of poisonous lipsticks; manipulators of the 3-inch yardstick, the 14-ounce pound, the box with the false bottom and any number of other pretentious rascals have been shown up for what they are. Recently he has been working on the pseudo-scientific quacks who sell goose-grease under a five-syllabled name at a profit of 1,800 percent; and in this he has aroused the opposition of the lordly American Medical Association. His offense was bringing out the fact that the AMA's sacrosanct *Journal* has increased its advertising revenue several million dollars since it dropped its policy of affixing a special label to medicines proved to be honest.

A good deal of this work has been ignored by media of communication dependent upon advertising, but enough has been spread abroad to prove that it is not without cause that the felonious element in American business hates the man. And the force of this hatred has lifted him out of the ruck of anonymities whose period in Washington has benefited none but themselves and has put the Tennesseean in the relatively short list of those whose membership in Congress has profited the country as a whole.

The economic effect of Kefauver's labors is an uncertain quantity. A fool and his money are soon parted, and there is not much that Congress can do about it. A certain number of Americans will continue to buy rattlesnake oil for a cancer cure, and pay its weight in gold for chopped hay in fancy packages, from here to eternity; for many men will believe what they want to believe, and above all they want to believe in miracles. Which makes it fairly certain that swindlers will live high through the predictable future.

But the psychological effect is apparent and excellent. After all, the mere existence of the pickpocket among us is not a serious threat to the survival of the nation. What really hurts is when he comes to be regarded as a worshipful master instead of a scurvy knave. For if we lose our cash, we can earn more; but judgement is extremely hard to replace.

There is all too much evidence that in recent years the people of the United States have shown a woeful lack of judgment, in the marketplace as in the forum. We have been sold enough snake oil to float, not a battleship, but the Atlantic Fleet; and what is far worse, we have exhibited a tendency to erect the purveyors thereof into stages and heroes.

Kefauver has made this clear, not by the McCarthy method of insinuation and unsupported accusation, but by putting the cold facts on record. Every man accused of skullduggery has been given ample opportunity to disprove the charges, and one or two have actually done so. These have profited by the experience, emerging from the investigation with honesty stamped upon their record like a check certified at the bank.

But these, representing mistakes of the investigators, have been few. For the most part, what has passed before the committee has been an astounding procession of poisoners, extortioners, manipulators of cheating weights and measures, and hex-doctors. Nor did these consist of human garbage scraped out of the gutters. Many of them are millionaires, some great tycoons with the ineffable gall to pose as pillars of society.

Perhaps the apothecaries, known now as the pharmaceutical industry, came off worst, but if so it was because their pretense, not their offense, has been greatest of all. There was no evidence that they have been distributing poisons, like the cosmeticians, nor contaminated stuff, like the deadly mayonnaise of recent memory. There was some testimony that they have made false claims for nostrums about as effective as Chief Ragged Bear's miraculous vegetable compound; but their besetting vice was avarice.

Public servants, they – at a profit of 1,900 percent. Nice work, if you can get it, and get away with it.



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# Very, Very Educational

*by James Deakin*

As this is written, the school bill appears as dead as Populism. It has been clobbered in the House Rules Committee, bludgeoned by institutionalized business, bloodied by bitter religious controversy and greeted coldly by much of the middle class – despite the baby boom, the crowded schools and the suspicion that Johnny's reading and writing need improving.

The depth of feeling generated by the church-state issue has created a general impression that this almost single-handedly has doomed the school measure. But had there been no parochial issue at all, it still might not have been possible to muster the necessary votes in the House for aid to education. Southern Democrats fear the proposed grants would somehow be used to force integration. The House Republican Policy Committee estimates that 80 to 90 percent of the GOP members would vote against the grant program, regardless. And the provision for increased teacher salaries has diluted the enthusiasm of a number of Democrats who, on form, should support the President unreservedly. A spark of life remains, but it is unlikely that the bill will catch fire in the hot, waning days of August; in which case general public school assistance (as differentiated from probable extension of aid to federally-impacted school districts) will lay over until next year, when it can be made an election issue. It is barely possible that a way can be found. But if it is, the President will have to do as much personal lobbying as he has for his foreign aid program.

The House, where the break-through must come if all or part of the bill is to be salvaged, has worked itself into one of those involved parliamentary situations which are the delight of those who think nothing is better than something. These gentlemen, with their year-in-and-year-out command of the committee chairmanships, know one thing and know it right well: It is almost always easier to defeat a bill than to pass it. Give them the added advantage of a phony "federal control" issue or a divisive religious quarrel (the school bill was afflicted with both), and you can only watch their sure-footed performance with wry and bitter admiration. Thus, a majority of the House Rules Committee, with Virginia's wily old Howard Smith pulling the strings, first tabled all three school bills, then moved to reconsider its own action and voted that down, too. The effect was to block all further moves in committee.

The committee had before it the Administration-backed proposal authorizing a total of $2.5 billion in federal grants to public secondary schools over a three-year period for construction or teacher salaries (the Senate already had passed a similar measure, adding operating expenses); another bill providing $1.8 billion in federal grants and loans to colleges over the next five years; and a third measure extending the National Defense Education Act and including authority for $125 million a year in long-term, moderate-interest federal loans to private and parochial secondary schools over a three year period.

All three were tabled in committee, eight to seven, with Rep. James J. Delaney of New York, a Democrat and a Catholic, casting the decisive vote. The motion to reconsider, offered by Smith's long-term lieutenant, Rep. William M. Colmer of Mississippi, was defeated by the same margin. Again Delaney's vote was decisive.

If the school bill *is* dead for this session, what killed it? The story has no definite beginning. School legislation has been kicked around Congress for a long time. The Senate last year passed a measure providing federal grants for classroom construction and/or teacher salaries. A version limited to construction got through the House for the first time last session, but the Southern Democrats and Charlie Halleck's disciplined Republicans attached the Powell anti-segregation rider to make sure it would never get to conference and, if it did, that the Senate would reject it. It never got to conference.

This year, people were saying, things would be different. Now we had a Democratic President and a Democratic platform committed to "federal grants to states for educational purposes they deem most pressing, including classroom construction and teachers' salaries. . . ."

A month after taking office, Mr. Kennedy sent Congress a big new program of federal aid to public schools and colleges. He set two goals: "A new standard of excellence in education, and the availability of such excellence to all who are willing and able to pursue it." He listed aid to education as one of five priority items on which he hoped for speedy Congressional action.

The religious issue came up fast. On January 17, before the inauguration, Cardinal Spellman assailed the report of the President-elect's task force on education, which had recommended federal outlays somewhat larger than the Administration subsequently proposed,

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but for the same purposes. The Cardinal warned that, "If Congress were to comply with the task force proposal . . . and to compel a child to attend a state school as a condition for sharing in education funds, it would be engaging in thought control, which, as Justice Jackson remarked, 'is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we have no claim to it'."

He added: "I believe and I state that these recommendations are unfair to most parents of the nation's 6,800,000 parochial and private school children . . . As an American whose loyalties have been challenged only by Communists, I cannot believe that Congress would accept the proposals of the task force. . . ."

Twelve days later, Archbishop Karl J. Alter of Cincinnati, chairman of the administrative board of the National Catholic Welfare Conference, declared that exclusion of Catholic schools from federal school aid programs had brought "injustice, discrimination and increased hardships." On March 3, the NCWC board took the formal position that it would be constitutional to include long-term, low-interest loans to non-public schools in a federal aid to education program. "In the event that a federal aid program is enacted which excludes children in private schools," the board declared, "these children will be the victims of discriminatory legislation. There will be no alternative but to oppose such discrimination."

Why did the hierarchy choose this year to insist on parochial aid? Catholic spokesmen have cited the financial difficulties facing their schools, contending that an already unfavorable competitive situation would be aggravated if public schools only were helped.

Those who look for subtler motives have speculated that some persons opposed to public school aid, both Catholic and Protestant, may have stirred up old religious quarrels as a way to kill the main bill. In this sense, the church-state issue would have been a sort of religious Powell amendment.

### *Sweeteners Were Offered*

At first, the President held to a firm line on federal aid to non-public schools. At his press conference on March 1, he told reporters the Constitution "clearly prohibits" direct federal assistance to such schools, adding: "There isn't any room for debate on that subject." A week later, he amplified this, saying he meant there was no room for discussion of the constitutional bar against outright federal grants to non-public schools but "there is obviously room for debate about loans." His personal opinion, Mr. Kennedy said, was that the Constitution would prohibit across-the-board (all-purpose) loans to parochial schools, but some loans for specific purposes might be socially desirable. (Indeed, they are now available!) He added that he would

"co-operate in every way" with Congress if it wanted to study the loan question independently of the Administration's public school bill and after that measure had been passed.

But in late March and April, the President had perceived the outlines of a possible compromise: To the 88 Catholic members of the House and those representing districts with substantial or predominant Catholic populations, the Administration would say, in effect – help us get the public school bill through *first*, and we will give you all the support we can in putting over some kind of a parochial aid bill *later*.

This, as it turned out, was precisely the proposal put forward by the Democratic liberals when the public school measure came down to the wire in June and July. They offered to give a separate parochial bill a fighting chance in Rules and on the floor but said they could guarantee nothing.

Msgr. Frederick G. Hochwalt, director of the NCWC's education department, responded by informing the Senate education subcommittee: "I wouldn't feel a separate [parochial aid] measure would have much of a chance." The bishops continued to press for joint legislation.

Mr. Kennedy's position in March against joining the two bills was based as much on immediate political con-



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siderations as on the First Amendment to the Constitution. He has always known he could not afford to be tagged as a "Catholic President." His election having diminished the religious issue, he hated to see it brought up again so soon. He feared the consequences for the rest of his legislative program this year and in the 1962 Congressional races.

Nevertheless, the bishops almost got what they wanted. Beginning in May, the Administration quietly changed its tune. Up to the Senate came Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare Abraham Ribicoff and Presidential Assistant Lawrence F. O'Brien for closed-door huddles with pro-school aid Democrats. They proceeded to jolt the Senators with the suggestion that a limited program of *construction* loans for non-public schools (and this is new) be included in the public school bill after all. Vice President Lyndon Johnson began saying the same thing privately.

Ribicoff argued that there was no chance of passing the public school bill in the House without the support of Catholic members and those from big Catholic districts. This was perhaps true, but it was only half the picture. There was even less chance of obtaining the needed southern Democratic votes for the public school measure with parochial aid attached. The Administration was in trouble in Dixie anyway. To attract the southern vote, a number of "sweeteners" had been offered, in some complicated trading. The House version of the public school measure, for instance, deleted a provision for "special project" funds which some southerners viewed as a device to advance integration.

There is no direct evidence that the President himself instructed Ribicoff and O'Brien to suggest the "togetherness" approach, but there is reason to believe that Theodore Sorensen, Mr. Kennedy's close White House confidant, knew about it in advance. The liberals noted this, considered Johnson's role as well, and drew the obvious conclusion.

They didn't like it very much. They felt that by this time the Catholic hierarchy had begun to back off anyway. In both houses, the proponents of the public school bill hoped to bring it to the floor unencumbered. They had in mind the 212 votes the conservative bloc had mustered against reforming the Rules Committee and the likelihood that three moderate Southern Democrats on Rules – James W. Trimble of Arkansas, Homer Thornberry of Texas and Carl Elliott of Alabama – would find it politically suicidal to vote for parochial aid. And these three votes were essential to get the bill out of committee.

One by one, strong supporters of the President in the Senate – Wayne Morse of Oregon, Pat McNamara of Michigan (a Catholic) and Lee Metcalf of Montana among them – turned down the Ribicoff proposal. A hurry up call went out to Speaker Sam Rayburn, who vetoed the compromise, saying a joint bill would kill public school aid in the House. After two days of conferences, Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield passed the word to Ribicoff, and the idea was dropped.

On May 25, the Senate passed the public school bill by a vote of 49 to 34. Morse, in a skillful display of floor management, held the lines firm against parochial aid amendments.

In the House, however, the Democrats split every which way. Majority Leader John W. McCormack, a scrupulous Catholic and a longtime political foe of the Kennedy faction in Massachusetts, came out hard for a parochial aid bill, insisting that it be considered first.

Rayburn turned him down in a stormy meeting in the Speaker's office, but "the Bishop of Boston," as Mr. Kennedy privately calls the tall, lean Irishman, kept the heat on. McCormack's chief lieutenants in the maneuvering that followed were Representatives Roman C. Pucinski (D., Ill.) and Herbert Zelenko (D., N.Y.). Pucinski is a Catholic. Zelenko is Jewish, but his district has a large Catholic population.

### *The Religious Storm*

"WASP" (White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant) pressure on moderate Southern and border state Democrats was likewise intense from the beginning. The Bible Belt resounded with exhortations from pulpits against any public assistance to Catholic schools. The National Council of Churches, representing 34 Protestant and Eastern Orthodox denominations, including the Methodists, Presbyterians, Lutherans and Baptists, raised the constitutional issue in a formal policy statement adopted by its general board on February 22 and again in a resolution last month: "If loans cannot be properly made to churches from public funds for the construction of houses of worship, neither can they properly be made to churches for the construction of schools which are an integral and organic agency of such churches." Two council officials sent letters to church leaders across the nation urging them to inform Congress of "Protestant concern and watchfulness" that federal aid be limited to public schools.

The Baptists joined in with a resolution by the Baptist Joint Committee on Public Affairs early in March, praising the President for his first press conference statement and attacking federal aid to parochial schools as "unwise, undesirable and unfavorable to our best national interest." The impact on Congress can best be appreciated when it is realized that the joint committee is maintained by six national Baptist conventions with a total membership of 20 million.

While the religious storm rained down on Capitol Hill, two old pros in the lobbying business gathered their forces. The National Education Association, rep-



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resenting some 750,000 teachers, school administrators and professional school employees, was pitted against the United States Chamber of Commerce, spokesman for hundreds of thousands of businessmen.

Repeatedly, in special "Flash" bulletins, the NEA urged its members across the country to write their Congressmen urging enactment of the public school bill. The message was carried to parent-teacher groups in the hope that parents would join the campaign.

The National Chamber of Commerce mounted a massive attack, aided by the National Association of Manufacturers. The Chamber sent members of its Washington staff around the country on an "aircade" that hit 12 cities from Massachusetts to Hawaii, drawing crowds of 800 to 1,000 business, professional and civic leaders in each community. Chamber officials held weekly strategy sessions on the school bill and other legislation with representatives of the Investment Bankers Association, American Farm Bureau Federation, American Legion, American Medical Association and the National Association of Real Estate Boards.

Formidable as these organized pressures were, the religious issue overshadowed them, realizing the President's worst fears. Over a period of months, dozens of House members told me the same thing: "Whatever I do, I'll be wrong." They were in the most unpleasant of all situations for the politician. Either way they stood on parochial aid would cost them votes.

Outside the South, the heaviest pressure apparently came from districts with minority Catholic populations of, say, 10 to 30 or 40 percent. Less hostility was reported from predominantly Protestant areas with little previous local experience of religious strife over such things as released time, Catholics on the school board or school busses for parochial students.

When the Rules Committee met on June 20, it had received the public school and college aid bills. The bill to extend the National Defense and Education Act authorizing parochial loans was still in Rep. Adam Clayton Powell's education and labor committee. Administration strategists hoped to start the process of Rules clearance for the public school bill as quickly as possible, before parochial aid came out of Powell's committee, and thus try to stave off a denominational debate. At the same time, they wanted to keep the June 20 Rules meeting open for action on the housing bill and the increase in the national debt limit.

With this in mind, Rep. Richard Bolling (D., Mo.), one of Rayburn's ablest allies, offered a motion to begin Rules hearings on the public school bill in a week. Republicans countered with a motion to delay action on this and college aid until parochial aid came to the committee, then consider all three together.

As expected, the five GOP members of Rules joined two Southerners – Chairman Smith and Colmer – in voting for the Republican motion. Without consulting the White House, Representatives Delaney and Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill, Jr. of Massachusetts, also a Catholic, sided with them, and the motion was approved, nine to six. However, Ray J. Madden (D., Ind), a Catholic whose district has a large Catholic population, voted against delaying consideration of the public school and college measures.

Bolling's motion had been a "soft" one, intended to give Delaney and O'Neill more time before they had to commit themselves. But Delaney, whose strong convictions were buttressed by his Catholic constituents and the bishops, insisted that parochial aid be taken up with the other two bills. Otherwise, he is reported to have said, he would just vote "no, no, no."

The President then ordered a showdown. He sent word to Powell to speed the parochial loan bill to Rules. But Mr. Kennedy put no particular pressure on Delaney. And when the Rules Committee met again on July 18, the Congressman from Queens gave Smith and the Republicans their eight to seven victory. O'Neill voted with the Administration this time, saying he did not want to table the college aid bill.

### *Construction Grants Again?*

The Administration has one lever left. Title II of its bill extends the now-expired program of aid to so-called impacted areas whose school enrollments have been swelled by the presence of nearby federal installations, chiefly military bases. More than 300 Congressmen have impacted areas in their districts, and a great many of these are in the South. Chairman Smith's district receives $506,000 a year in this type of assistance, Colmer's $999,299.

The final strategy is not yet clear. The possibilities mentioned include a discharge petition, suspension of House rules, calendar Wednesday or a separate Title II (impacted areas) bill to which the general school aid program would be added in conference with the Senate. McCormack says he can get college aid through the House under suspension of the rules, and some form of impacted area aid is pretty sure to be enacted.

Calendar Wednesday looks like the best bet to many. This procedure, to be successful, requires real effort by Speaker Rayburn, who must persuade the chairmen of committees ahead of education alphabetically to pass. Mr. Sam usually knows about how far the House is willing to go – how far the members think it is safe to go. He himself has never been keen on federal aid for higher teacher salaries, but he is all for the schoolhouse. And this could mean that last year's House version of the school bill, limited to construction, will be dusted off and resubmitted. A bill combining construction grants and aid to impacted areas is being drafted.



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# Defense on the New Frontier

*by Morton H. Halperin*

The Kennedy Administration came into office pledged to a sweeping reappraisal of the policies of its predecessor in virtually every field. In particular, attacks on the Eisenhower defense and disarmament program had figured prominently in the campaign, and Kennedy and a number of his advisers were committed to major revisions in the scope and direction of national security policy. Although some of these proposed changes – particularly the new emphasis on guerrilla warfare – have received some attention in recent months, much of the public debate has focused on the "political" disputes left over from the past.

The nation's press and Congressional hearings and reports have rehashed the arguments over the B-70 bomber, Nike-Zeus, waste, and the "missile gap." Some commentators have observed that, despite the criticisms which were made by the President and some of his advisers before taking office, there have not been any major changes in defense policy. Nonetheless, despite the lack of public attention, the Kennedy Administration has instituted important changes in military strategy which are likely to have a crucial effect on the nation's future. In order to clarify the nature and significance of these changes it is necessary to describe briefly American security policy under Eisenhower.

Through the post-war period American military policy has been concerned primarily with the deterrence and fighting of a general war between the United States and the Soviet Union. Much of the defense budget has gone into major-war preparations. The strategy adopted by the United States was based on the notion of "spasm war"—that is, a war which once begun would be fought until both sides had exhausted their strategic forces. If war came the United States strategic forces were to fire everything they had as quickly as possible. While the official policy called for waiting for an order from the President before firing, in practice it was (and perhaps still is) likely that at least some Strategic Air Command bombers and missiles would fire in the event of war without waiting for a command.

Much less attention was paid during the Eisenhower Administration to the problems of the defense of local areas. Insofar as it recognized the problem, the White House seemed to assume that the capacity being developed for general war was sufficient to deal with local military threats. Although the policy was somewhat ambiguous, military training, deployment, and equipment policy were based on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used any time that American troops were engaged in warfare. The Eisenhower Administration had inherited a confused civil defense program and did nothing to alter the situation.

American policy toward disarmament was perhaps the least satisfactory in the post-war period. Like civil defense, disarmament was treated in isolation from military policy rather than as an important element in a unified national security policy. American disarmament proposals which were presented at international conferences were thrown together with incredible haste and with little, if any, attention to the impact of the proposals on American military strategy. In between conferences virtually no attention was paid to the development of a long range arms control policy and no research was undertaken on the complex political, military, and technical problems of arms control.

Some of the glaring deficiencies in American national security policy sketched above were made into campaign issues by Mr. Kennedy. The Democratic Presidential nominee repeatedly pointed out the deficiencies in the country's arms control position and the need for a much greater effort to develop proposals which were militarily and politically acceptable to the United States and which would enhance the likelihood of peace. Deficiencies in America's local war preparations, particularly the vital need for a greater air lift capability, were also campaign issues. Although shortcomings in civil defense and general war strategy were not stressed (except for the missile gap issue) and were probably not as clear to the incoming President, they had been much discussed among private students of national security policy, many of whom have since taken posts in the Administration.

The stage was thus set for another "new look" at American military policy. The most decisive Presidential effort has been in the field of limited war. President Kennedy personally ordered the Pentagon to deal with limited war as a separate strategic problem requiring the development of a capability and doctrine, the procurement of additional air and sea lift capability, and increased training for unconventional guerrilla warfare. Recently he brought into the White House as an adviser General Maxwell Taylor, who retired from the Army

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because of failure to secure approval for his programs to increase substantially limited war capability.

The Pentagon, with the strong support of the State Department and the White House, has also moved to halt the trend toward complete reliance on nuclear weapons by American forces, particularly in the NATO area. The arguments (which are accepted by virtually all civilian strategists and increasing numbers of military men) against relying completely on nuclear weapons may be summarized briefly as follows:

1 – The initiation of the use of nuclear weapons by the United States in a local war is likely to have major adverse political consequences among America's allies and neutrals.

2 – While the possibility of a nuclear war's remaining local cannot be entirely ruled out, the use of nuclear weapons would substantially increase the likelihood that a local war expanded greatly or induced a preemptive global war.

3 – Contrary to a widespread assumption, the use of nuclear weapons in a local war would not be to the battlefield advantage of the United States. In particular, nuclear weapons do not reduce manpower requirements, nor do they necessarily aid the defense.

Acting on the reasoning summarized above, the Administration has taken several steps to lessen American dependence on nuclear weapons. It has approved expanded research efforts to develop advanced conventional equipment. It has halted the shipment to Europe of equipment designed only for nuclear use. And it has indicated that in a number of situations nuclear weapons might not be used in a local war. But it has by no means gone all the way in reversing the trend and steps must be taken if the US is to have an adequate conventional capability and if the likelihood of nuclear weapons' being used in a local war is to be reduced.

Because the US has explicitly depended on the use of nuclear weapons to defend its allies, renunciation of their use for any purpose but retaliation against a nuclear attack would in the short run have major adverse political consequences. However, this renunciation is the logical conclusion to the reversal of policy instituted by the Kennedy Administration and could make a substantial contribution to Western defense.

Such a program could most effectively be signalled by a policy declaration by the President that we will never initiate the use of nuclear weapons. Since the Russians have consistently advocated an international agreement banning the first use of nuclear weapons, it might be possible and desirable to sign such an agreement. Before taking this step, however, the United States would have to convince its allies that this did not represent an American retreat, that we were still prepared to live up to our obligations, and that the non-use of nuclear weapons would make the defense of their homelands easier, not more difficult. Convincing our non-European allies of this might not be too difficult. The possibility of American use of nuclear weapons in Asia and the Middle East has never been very great and such a declaration might be viewed as increasing the likelihood of American conventional intervention in a local area, even at a very low level.

In Europe, however, where the American commitment to use nuclear weapons has been more explicit and more credible, it will be difficult to withdraw nuclear weapons without creating major alliance problems. But since it is in Europe's strategic interest to remove nuclear weapons, both in the physical sense of getting them out of Europe and in the figurative sense of removing the threat of first use, it ought to be possible to get European cooperation. The sending of an additional American division to Europe might be an effective signal to counter the fear that America was about to abandon her European allies.

American renunciation of first use of nuclear weapons should be preceded by an intensive effort to convince our allies of the wisdom of the move. But however desirable an increase in NATO strength may be, the declaration should not be contingent upon an increase in the number of NATO divisions in Europe. This is because *at any given level of force* the West has a better chance of defending Europe if nuclear weapons are not used by both sides.

### *A Strategy for General War*

Major steps have, then, been taken to improve America's limited war capability, but clearly we do not yet have an optimum capability and strategy. Equally, in general war strategy major changes are underway, but other decisions remain to be made.

The Administration first turned its attention to reducing the period of the "missile gap" by speeding up the production of second generation Minuteman and Polaris missiles, which would be both invulnerable and powerful enough to perform the deterrent role. In addition the Pentagon set in motion operations to change the General war posture from one of "spasm war" to reflect what is called a "controlled war" posture. In particular, the President in his budget message announced that the Pentagon was authorized to increase expenditures substantially on command and control facilities for American strategic forces. This is designed to insure that control of the use of nuclear missiles and SAC would remain in the hands of the President before, up to, and during a thermonuclear war: not only would the signal to launch any American strategic forces be given only by the President, but also the President would have discretion in deciding how much force to launch and against what targets. Adequate American



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# The Balance of TERROR




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command and control for general war would also create the possibility – provided the Soviets have similar facilities – for intra-war negotiations aimed at bringing a thermonuclear war to an end before both sides had exhausted all of their forces, and perhaps at negotiating, or reaffirming previous agreements to avoid certain targets (*e.g.*, cities) during a thermonuclear war.

The complete lack of attention previously paid to these possibilities means that considerably more time and effort will have to be expended before the United States has adequate command and control capability to reduce the danger of accidental or unauthorized firings and to make possible the fighting of a controlled war. Although the Administration has recognized and acted on the need to develop command and control and to accelerate current production of invulnerable strategic systems, it has yet to adopt a clear general war strategy.

Two major problems which have yet to be settled are the desired magnitude of the strategic force and what its targets should be, assuming that the commitment to a controlled posture is firm and will be carried through. The dispute over targeting concerns the question of whether the United States should adopt a "counter-force" or "counter-city" targeting policy; should American missiles and planes aim to destroy Soviet cities in the event of an attack or should they aim to destroy Soviet missile sites and other military installations. The issues involved are complex and difficult and it may be that some mix of the two is the optimum solution. But until a clear decision is made, such other questions as the desirable size of the force and the role of particular systems such as the B-70 cannot sensibly be answered.

While a decision on the desirable ultimate civil defense establishment should also await a clarification of strategic objectives, the impoverished nature of our present civil defense effort suggests that much can be done in the interim. The previous Administration ran civil defense programs on the basis of two false premises: first, that civil defense could be made a state and local obligation and second, that it was not a part of defense policy. The Kennedy Administration has moved to correct this by assuming Federal responsibility for civil defense and putting it under the Secretary of Defense. It has also recommended the adoption of a number of interim, if expensive, measures including the construction of some fall-out shelters.

As was suggested above, it was perhaps in the field of disarmament and arms control that candidate Kennedy most clearly committed himself to change, and in which performance has been most disappointing. It should be said that this description refers to general arms control policy and not to the nuclear test ban negotiations. The Administration moved quickly to reevaluate the motives behind the test ban and the dangers involved. It laid before the Geneva Conference a complete treaty which it was prepared to sign and which included a number of concessions from the previous American position. In addition the US indicated its willingness to compromise even further, particularly on the politically explosive, if not actually crucial, question of on-site inspections. Although these actions have unfortunately not moved us closer to a treaty, they have demonstrated to allies and neutrals our sincere desire for a test ban. Even more important they have shown the ability of the US to weigh the political and military implications of an arms control proposal and to propose an agreement which it was really prepared to live with.

### *The Eisenhower Pattern*

Unfortunately, on the matter of general arms control, the Administration seems to be following the pattern of the previous Administration. It has only very recently drafted legislation for the establishment of an agency authorized to carry out research and to draft arms control proposals which would contribute to American and international security. In the meantime, it has committed us to full-scale disarmament negotiations within the next few months. Preparations have proceeded as in the past. With the aid of a crash program by a large group of consultants, the Administration put together within a few months a comprehensive arms control package. Again, the emphasis is on the propaganda aspects. None of the items in the package could have been, or in fact has been, examined with sufficient detail so that the Administration could have even a reasonable estimate of its impact on national security. The package is not one that the Administration has any expectation of seriously negotiating with the Soviets.

It is only when planning for disarmament conferences is long-term, with the United States submitting proposals after it is satisfied with them and not simply to meet a conference deadline that it will be possible for this nation to have a respectable and responsible arms control program. We also need to recognize that we are in fact constantly negotiating with the Soviets over arms control by our actions and statements and that it is possible to arrive at both informal and formal agreements by methods other than public negotiation in a multinational arms control conference.

The national security in the coming decade will depend on the development and implementation of a unilateral military policy capable of coping with the continuing Sino-Soviet military threat, and, on a vigorous search for acceptable arms control measures designed to complement unilateral policy in pursuit of national and international security.



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# *The World of George Kennan*

*by Louis J. Halle*

It is a commonplace that every field of thought or scholarship is dominated by its own orthodoxy. Such an orthodoxy, taking the form of accepted views and accepted modes of expressing them, is what distinguishes the insiders from the outsiders.

The role of orthodoxy is well exemplified, today, in the new and highly competitive field of Russian studies – in what is more loosely called "kremlinology." The practitioners of kremlinology have particular reason to feel insecure, if only because their vocation involves, at best, such a high proportion of guesswork about what is going on at a distance and in secret. They are all conscious of how little they can really know, of how easy it is to be wrong, and of how they may be discredited, to the detriment of their careers, if they are caught in error. The exceptional competitiveness and insecurity in this field make for particular cautiousness among those who work in it, and for a particularly strict adherence to that consensus of the insiders which constitutes orthodoxy. By dissenting they would expose themselves to the charge of being unsound (the word by which the insiders identify outsiders), a risk which can be accorded only by those who are outsiders anyway, who are not making their careers exclusively as kremlinologists.

*Russia and the West Under Lenin and Stalin*
by George F. Kennan
(Little, Brown; $5.75)

Like other orthodoxies, however, kremlinological orthodoxy suffers from being constantly overtaken by developing circumstances that make it constantly obsolescent if not obsolete. For reasons that it would be interesting to explore, it has tended from the outset of the Cold War to deny the possibility of any fundamental change in Soviet society, in Soviet policy, or in the course of the Soviet Union's expansive drive. It has therefore been observable that, when change does occur, the insiders are the last to recognize it.

For most of two years after Stalin's death, the State Department experts were taking the line that no real change had ensued: Russia under Stalin's successors, they said, was essentially what it had been under Stalin, its drive and direction unaltered. Consequently, when the fact of change became unmistakable, a shifting of kremlinological personnel had to take place.

Before October of 1956, the experts maintained that Moscow was able, without any extraordinary difficulty, to keep the satellite populations under absolute control – so much so that, even in case it invaded Western Europe, it would not have to worry about its lines of communication across the satellite territories. Since the Polish and Hungarian uprisings, no one maintains any more that this is true.

From the outset the experts committed themselves to the view that no dissension within the Communist ranks was possible. Even the break between Russia and Yugoslavia seemed not to affect their thinking. They went right on to insist that no real difference of opinion between the Soviet Union and Red China (which, one recalls, was regarded as just another satellite) could be expected. They committed themselves so firmly to this that, when the inevitable dissension began to come into the open, their embarrassment was conspicuous. Forced by the fact to retreat from their extreme position, they have today taken their stand on the dogma that the present dissension is in the nature of a family quarrel only, that it cannot lead to any real break because the factors that unite the two Communist powers outweigh the issues that divide them by such large margin.

In pointing out the limitations of the inside experts, I would not have it thought that we could do without them. They represent an element of discipline to wishful thinking and a necessary check on the unorthodox; and they are quite indispensable for producing technical and topical estimates, whether of Soviet military doctrine, of Soviet economic policies, or of personnel shifts inside the Soviet bureaucracy. It is only the large final judgments for which they tend to be disqualified. What is needed for such judgments is a sense of how history moves, an understanding of the constant elements in human society, and a perspective that shows every particular thing in its relation to the whole. No specialist, in his capacity as such, has these qualifications.

All this is by way of introduction to the phenomenon that is George Kennan. Kennan represents the distinction of an individual mind that thinks for itself, that goes its own way. Consequently, the "unsoundness" of George Kennan has for years been a staple of conversation in the academic departments of Russian studies. No doubt he has sometimes been wrong, and when wrong he has suffered from the vulnerability of one who is wrong alone, as opposed to the invulnerability of those who are wrong all together. I am impressed, however, by the fact that,

**Summer Schedule**

During the summer months, *The New Republic* will not appear on the following dates:

July 17 July 31
August 14 August 28

Weekly publication will be resumed with the issue dated September 4.



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standing independent of intellectual fashion and orthodoxy, he has tended to be right in what counts. He has not been like the expert of the definition, who avoids all small errors as he makes his way on to the one grand fallacy.

Reading Mr. Kennan's latest book, which has been largely put together from lectures given at Oxford and Harvard, I was struck by the degree to which his personal vision of the world is integrated and whole. A complete study of that vision, of the world of George Kennan, would require a monograph, but some of its elements may be identified here.

The world of that vision is, in the first place, a world of good and evil. The good is represented by a conventional propriety that applies to the conduct of personal relations and relations among sovereign states alike. Superficially, this may appear simply as a matter of good manners, but in its hidden roots it is civilization itself, with all its ideals and (to use a key word in the Kennanite vocabulary) its hopefulness. The failure of the Russian governments, after 1917, to accept this conventional propriety as a basis for their relations with the rest of the world has been a profound evil. It represents an abnormality, and nothing hopeful in a lasting sense will come about except as the development of civilization in Russia makes for a return to the civilized norm in the conduct of international relations. This gives to all of Kennan's views a basis of conviction. Part of the reason why he writes so movingly is that, in a deep and quiet way, he believes so strongly in the legitimacy of our challenged civilization.

Again, while he does not tell us this in so many words, he obviously does not share the delusions of the unsophisticated about the role and significance of ideology in human affairs. In his vision, those who constitute the government in Moscow are people first and Communists second. It never occurs to him, therefore, to explain the behavior of the Chicherins and Litvinovs, the Stalins and Khrushchevs, simply by the maxims of Marx or the sayings of Lenin. These persons represent live, unreconstructed humanity rather than some theoretical abstraction called Marxian Man. In this vision, Stalin appears as a good deal closer to Ivan the Terrible than to any doctrinaire concept of what the representative of the workers of the world should be. Gibbon explains him better than Marx.

Inevitably, the view of Stalin as an evil tyrant rather than as Marxian Man leads to an interpretation of the events of his reign that is different from the conventional interpretation. Take, for example, the following passage: "From the bourgeois world, as from his political entourage in the world of Communism, Stalin wanted only one thing: weakness. This was not at all identical with revolution. Unless other states were very small, and contiguous to Russia's borders, so that there were good prospects for controlling them by the same concealed police methods he employed in Russia, Stalin did not want other states to be Communist." Or again: ". . . universal world dominion is a technical impossibility, and . . . the effectiveness of the power radiated from any one national center decreases in proportion to the distance involved, and to the degree of cultural disparity. It was this reality that Stalin, in a very incipient way, was up against in his encounter with Chinese Communism and the Kuomintang in 1927."

One of the elements in Kennan's realism, as it seems to me, is that "Stalinism" appears in some senses to be a more significant term to him than "Communism." "Communism," after all, may be so many different things that one can hardly generalize usefully about it, but "Stalinism" is tied to the personality and the policy of one man who, in the Kennanite world, represented the quintessence of human evil. When Stalin at last died, therefore, Kennan saw possibilities for hope that did not appear to those who thought of Russia as being under the government, not of mortal men, but of a body of immutable ideological doctrine. (One is tempted to recall a remark of Jimmy Walker when a censorship bill was up for consideration in the New York legislature. He said he had heard of girls being "ruined," but never by a book.)

This is not to say that ideology has no significant place in the world of George Kennan. He sees the implacable hostility of successive Soviet governments to the bourgeois world as one consequence of an ideological training that emphasizes hatred and distrust, and that closes the channels of fruitful communication. Here, however, as in other instances, the role of ideology, though great, is something quite different from its pretensions. Marxist doctrine has powerfully influenced the men who have governed in Moscow, but not in the way the Marxist fathers intended.

Finally, Kennan appears to see what few who have not profited from long experience inside government can see as vividly, that governments do not always know what they are doing. Simple people without experience are prone to believe that the men in Washington act with deliberation on the basis of an insight denied to the rest of us; and people have always tended to assume that, however feckless they might themselves be, their enemies plotted every move with a fiendish and elaborate purposefulness that was more than human. We were familiar, in Stalin's day, with the view that his every move represented the far-sightedness of the master chess-player, and we still have those among us who believe that Khrushchev never sneezes except in accordance with a Master Plan left by Lenin. In the world of George Kennan, however, the record is largely one of blindness and blundering on both sides, in the West and in Moscow alike.

This is the basis for the sense of tragedy that pervades Kennan's historical writing. It is, perhaps, not quite grand tragedy in the Greek or Shakespearian senses, since one finds a sort of desperate insistence that the blindness and blundering are not necessary, hence not inevitable. What is tragic is that the world is repeatedly condemned to horror quite unnecessarily. If the statesmen had been up to what we have a right to expect of them, neither of the two world wars would have occurred, the revolutionary extremist would not have triumphed over the revolutionary moderates in post-czarist Russia, and the Weimar Republic would not have succumbed to Hitler. In fact, one repeatedly sees these great issues as turning on a hair. Thus, if the German people in 1933 had had only a little more



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patience with the Brüning Government, which was on the verge of solving the economic crisis when it was dismissed, the Nazis might never have come to power. "The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars, but in ourselves. . . ." Thucydides had much the same view.

When it comes to the account of the military interventions in Russia by the Western allies, from 1918 to 1920, Kennan is virtually compelled to adopt the pen of a Voltaire to do justice to the element of comedy in the tragedy. At the great crisis in Russian affairs of March, 1918, when the Congress of Soviets was about to ratify the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, our American Military Attaché in Russia, who occupied the post in consequence of having had his name confused with another's by the War Department, put an important telegram to Washington into his pocket and forgot to send it. The American and British interventions took place without any purpose related to the actualities of the situation. They took place against the wills of Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George, who were simply too busy with other matters to address themselves effectively to Russian policy. But these interventions were so decisive in their effect, says Kennan, "that I think it may well be questioned whether Bolshevism would ever have prevailed throughout Russia had the Western governments not aided its progress to power by this ill-conceived interference." (These words were written before they could have any application to our Cuban intervention of April, 1961.)

This kind of tragic nonsense, Kennan seems to be telling us, is quite unnecessary, and we ought to stop it this minute. There is no reason why we can't begin to behave sensibly at last, and all hope depends on this.

I can best sum up the world of George Kennan by noting that, unlike the world of so many technical specialists, it is a world of humanity – more specifically, a world of human beings who seem constantly to be under their own curse. It is this rather than a world of statistics, abstract principles, and dogmas. And because it is this, Kennan views it all with a deep compassion. There are no absolute and final differences between Russian humanity and, let us say, American humanity. "One can remember," he writes in one of his memorable perorations, "that *some degree of conflict* and antagonism is present in every international relationship; *some* measure of compromise is necessary everywhere, if political societies are to live together on the same planet. Those who bear this in mind will be inclined to doubt whether there is such a thing as total antagonism, any more than there is such a thing as total identity of interests. Whoever sees it this way will realize that the illusion of total antagonism can be created only by a complete absence of effective communication; and for this reason he will be inclined to doubt, as I myself must confess to doing, whether an enemy with whom one can communicate is really entirely an enemy, after all."

# *Chips off the Old Block*

*by Honor Tracy*

The children of the great have the wind against them when they try to establish an identity of their own, and if they are audacious enough to attempt it on the parental ground it behooves us all to cheer them on. With this in mind I approached *The Foxglove Saga* sunnily, resolved to view it with an entirely fresh eye, to consider it as the work of a young Mr. Orlando Jones or a Master Dagobert Smith. But, like a jury directed to dismiss from its mind some legally irrelevant but humanly fascinating fact, I soon came off it. The truth is that this intermittently sparkling piece of juvenilia has many good things in it which do not so much derive from Mr. Evelyn Waugh as belong to him entirely. They are genuine chips off the old block. There is, in the better parts, the same rueful awareness of contradiction and confusion, the wry sense of human impotence, the appallingly sharp eye for human frightfulness, the savagery, the gorgeous fun.

*The Foxglove Saga*
by Auberon Waugh
(Simon & Schuster; $3.95)

There is a gay, naïve and mostly endearing rattle, with a whiff now and then from *The Young Visitors* and occasional blobs of sheer nastiness that, outside the nursery, are more than a little startling.

The story opens with the hero, if hero is the word, at a big Catholic school, with harsh, pernickety or worldly monks and, socially speaking, a very mixed bag of boys, whose pecadilloes range from buggery to the picking of noses. Martin Foxglove, who is prone to the first, has a friend or rather a habitual associate called Stoat, an addict of the second and a beast indeed, as must surely be clear from the fact that his father is a dentist and his Christian name Kenneth. The latter crime, indeed, is so heinous that when Lady Foxglove comes to take both boys to dinner they pretend that it is "Henry" instad of "Kenneth," for fear she might veto their friendship.

Very likely my perceptions are blunter than those of Mr. Waugh, for I cannot see that "Kenneth" is worse than "Derek," which is the name of Foxglove senior. In fact this side of it is all rather a puzzle, for Sir Derek is a mere medico too, if a very distinguished one, and yet he is as upper-class as can be, with a country place and private chapel, a good town address, lots of money and a beautiful snobbish wife, as saintly a bitch as ever distributed Lourdes water and gooseberry jelly to the respectful poor. Sir Derek dies, leaving a heartbroken widow to look ravishing at the funeral and to arrange for his biography. Previously he has made one of those complicated financial arrangements to avoid death duties and Martin is to inherit everything when he is twenty-one. Then he will turn poor Mummy out of Bidcombe and squander the capital like a lord.

Before he comes of age, however, Martin puts in some time with a crack regiment, the Pigs, and now we are deep in father's territory. We have the jaunty common little officer, cosy and menacing in turn, who calls the men "laddies," the stupid or ferrety NCOs, the catastrophes awaiting the innocent,



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the popular esteem for all that is scoundrelly and the general feel of planned and purposeful lunacy. Everything is there except the niceness, but how funny it still is! and what a pity that Mr. Waugh should turn from the Army, which he knows, and from the picaresque, which suits him admirably, to an ill-conceived venture into the macabre and the gothic.

A young man called Dooney, who has abandoned a medical career for a literary and is Sir Derek's biographer, comes on a poem by Stoat's dentist father revealing that he had a romantic passion for the dead man when they were both at school. There is little enough in it, but Lady Foxglove's brain is rotten with piety and she leaps to the conclusion that her husband was secretly a homosexual all his life. When Dooney blackmails her she pays up. Dooney marries a nurse and their child is a monster: a punishment for wickedness, undoubtedly, and yet we cannot help thinking it is also because he is called Ron and speaks with an accent, belongs in a word, to the lower middle-class so peculiarly repugnant to the Waughs. The development and conclusion of this theme are revolting beyond belief and, as if the author himself were a trifle overcome, the novel limps unrelieved to its ending.

I think what the book chiefly lacks is a valid point of view. The publisher describes it as a satire on the change and decay of modern England but one cannot effectively satirize a state of affairs without having seen an alternative. Mr. Waugh is too young to have known the England whose passing drew such cries of pain from his father, and a man of 22 who intends to be a writer could do worse than ask himself if the change is all bad, if the decay is sure. Mr. Evelyn Waugh's antagonism to Ron and Ken and Edgar was natural and honest, for they were the New Men, thrusting, grabbing, scheming, who threatened the patrician order he loved: his son, without knowing that order, has adopted the attitude and the tone of voice just as he has taken over the *personae*.

A novelist has to know where he stands, and it is just possible that Auberon Waugh is more a man of his time than he may realize.

# The Vintage Robert Graves

*by Richmond Lattimore*

A few facts and rough statistics will tell part of the story. This collection contains over 250 poems which fill about 300 net pages. I do not find any poem which runs to a hundred lines, and few come near that figure. This, Mr. Graves tells us, is his fifth such collection, and each time he has thrown

*Collected Poems*
by Robert Graves
(Doubleday; $5.95)

out the duds. He has in fact been writing good poems since 1914 and has been prolific in other fields as well. He is that almost obsolete individual, the unappropriated professional poet, self-supported by his own writing in more profitable fields.

I believe that good poets in our time are not scarce at all, but delightfully abundant. Nevertheless, my first impression on reading through this collection is simply: what a *lot* of good poems – hard to match nowadays. I would say further that in dutifully reading all, as a reviewer must, I have not been bored nor yet baffled, mystified, or frustrated (some poets I strongly admire do these things to me much of the time). I have surely missed many allusions but have almost always been able to find and follow sense, not nonsense. The sentences have syntax. The rhymes rhyme. The lines scan. In fact they scan a bit too orderly for me. Mr. Graves' ear is good enough for me to wish he would be more adventurous with it. Also, when he does score it is with a whole poem or thought, not with a single line or image. These are the virtues and limitations of what may be called "classical" poetry, and Mr. Graves consciously dissociates himself from the "Modernists." I am not sure exactly what he means by this, and you do not know exactly what I mean, but we all know well enough for the term to serve; up to a point.

But that is not all. Going back over the collection, I find three levels. There are poems in which the facility of the pot-boiling professional has betrayed the master craftsman. I sometimes find Mr. Graves too constantly deft – to put it kindly. The second group contains the bulk of the book: good poems: well made, witty, intelligent, interesting; but not exciting, nor moving: impressive in their number, but somehow unfairly drained of distinction by their very level of sound quality. The last, smallest group is worth all the rest: almost a dozen masterpieces, where Mr. Graves has either surprised himself, or has said what he had to say with that lonely finality and rightness which always, when I find it, moves me as much as what is more obviously surprising. My favorite piece, "Alexander and Queen Janet," runs to sixty-eight lines – too long to quote. Instead, I give "The Florist Rose":

This wax-mannequin nude, the florist rose,
She of the long stem and too glossy leaf,
Is dead to honest greenfly and leaf-cutter:
Behind plate-glass watches the yellow fogs.

Claims kin with the robust male aeroplane
Whom eagles hate and phantoms of the air,
Who has no legend as she breaks from legend –
From fellowship with sword and sail and crown.

Experiment's flower, scentless (he its bird);
Is dewed by the spray-gun; is tender-thorned;
Pouts, false-virginal, between bud and bloom;
Bought as a love-gift, droops within the day.

I list also "The Blue-Fly," "The General Elliott," "Nature's Lineaments," "Hotel Bed at Lugano," "Single Fare," "Certain Mercies," "The Climate of Thought," and "To Juan at the Winter Solstice." Anyone ought to be proud to have written those; and I think further readings would turn up and reveal a few more.



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# A Love Affair with the United States

*by Julian Mayfield*

With two novels, one of them the remarkable *Go Tell It on the Mountain*, and a book of essays, James Baldwin has already made his mark on American literature. In this second collection

*Nobody Knows My Name*
by James Baldwin
(Dial; $4.50)

of his writing he confirms that he is among the most penetrating and perceptive of American thinkers.

Baldwin is a man possessed by the necessity of coming to grips with himself and his country. He is also concerned with forcing our nation – with which he has had a turbulent love affair – to come to grips with itself. Because he is a gifted black man in an environment controlled by whites, his view of life is especially illuminating. He is, as he said in a recent radio discussion, "the maid" in the American house. He is the outsider within, the agonized repository of the family's most intimate secrets.

Most of the pieces in the new book grapple with American race relations. But the range of Baldwin's interest is wide, though his view is always intensely personal. For example, in "The Northern Protestant" he attempts to convey the essence of the Swedish cinema artist, Ingmar Bergman, but he only succeeds in revealing more about James Baldwin. In "The Male Prison" he sheds new light on Andre Gide and homosexuality.

One essay, "East River, Downtown," which deals with the Negro demonstration in the UN Security Council precipitated by the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, should be must reading. Baldwin had intended (like me) to be among the demonstrators himself. Most Americans quickly assumed that the demonstration was Communist-inspired. Only James Reston of *The New York Times*, among the major journalists, perceived that the riot meant that something was seriously wrong in the Negro community.

"What I find appalling," Baldwin writes, "... is the American assumption that the Negro is so contented with his lot here that only the cynical agents of a foreign power can rouse him to protest." And later, in the same piece: "What is demanded now, and at once, is not that Negroes continue to adjust themselves to the cruel racial pressures of life in the United States, but that the United States readjust itself to the facts of life in the present world."

This is not the strident voice of a flaming radical. It is an eloquent plea from a native artist seriously concerned with the fate of the country to which he has finally returned after a long and anguished exile.

The title essay originally appeared in *Partisan Review* as "A Letter from The South." It is a poignant, enduring document of a northern Negro's first exposure to Dixie. In Atlanta, bitterly aware of the segregated bus he was about to board, Baldwin looked into the eyes of an old black man:

> "His eyes seemed to say that what I was feeling he had been feeling, at much higher pressure, all his life. But my eyes would never see the hell his eyes had seen. And this hell was, simply, that he had never in his life owned anything, not his wife, not his house, not his child, which could not, at any instant, be taken from him by the power of white people. This is what paternalism means. And for the rest of the time I was in the South I watched the eyes of old black men."

A collection of pieces, written over a period of years, is bound to be uneven. One wonders why Baldwin and his editors chose to include "A Fly in the Buttermilk" and "Princess and Power," two articles as close to the pedestrian as the author is likely to get. And occasionally Baldwin wades into waters over his head. W.E.B. DuBois is not, as Baldwin states, in "East River, Downtown," disillusioned. Dr. DuBois is the progenitor of all black American intellectuals, including Baldwin. At the great age of ninety-three, he is a socialist whose work is known and respected in nearly every country except his own.

I do not mean to suggest that James Baldwin is ever less than honest. Honesty and irreverence are his most maddening qualities as a writer and a human being. In this book he might have let Richard Wright rest in peace, but in "Alas, Poor Richard," Baldwin uncovers again, like an old sore, the long hostility between him and Wright. Each had fled American racism and sought refuge in Paris; neither had found a hiding place. Later Baldwin would force himself to return while Wright would continue to create novels about an America that had disappeared. In "Alas, Poor Richard," as with his "love letter" on Norman Mailer ("A Black Boy Looks at The White Boy"), Baldwin reveals so much about himself that the embarrassed reader cannot help feeling he has stumbled upon a person performing a private act. Certainly no writer since Gide has written with such naked honesty.


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# JULES FEIFFER


YOU'RE RETURNING MY HENRY MILLERS - WHAT DOES THIS MEAN HUEY?
IT MEANS IT'S BEEN NICE BUT - YOU KNOW, BABY?
YOU'VE LOST INTEREST IN ME - I SUSPECTED IT WAS COMING -
YEAH - WELL - I'M TIRED - YOU KNOW?
IT BEGAN WHEN I LIKED "LA DOLCE VITA" AND YOU DIDN'T - AM I RIGHT? I'VE GOT TO KNOW!
BABY - WHY FIGHT IT - YOU KNOW?
WE HAVE AN AWFUL LOT IN COMMON, HUEY - I'VE BEEN REASSESSING MY VALUES AND YOU WERE RIGHT - I AM STIFLED!
GOOD NEWS, BABY, BUT - YOU KNOW-?
I MEAN - STEMMING FROM A PURITANICAL TRADITION AS I DO THERE'S STILL MUCH THAT I HAVE TO CAST OFF -
BABY, WHEN SOMETHING'S DEAD - YOU KNOW-? IT'S DEAD!
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YEAH? WELL, I DON'T TEACH. STAY COOL, BABY.
HUEY-! I'D LIKE YOU TO KEEP THE MILLERS
YOU'RE THE READER, BABY -
WON'T ANYONE HAVE PATIENCE WITH LATE BEGINNERS?
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MOVIES

# Large and Little Wars

*The Ninth Circle* (Jadran)
*Fate of a Man* (Lopert)
*Secrets of Women* (Janus)

According to Donald Richie's article in the summer issue of *Film Quarterly*, the Yugoslavian film industry is in strange imbalance. They produce about a thousand shorts but only about fifteen feature films a year. One of their recent features to reach us – and the first Yugoslav film I have seen – is *The Ninth Circle*, a story of Nazi-occupied Zagreb. Richie states that Yugoslav shorts have developed their own styles and virtues and that Yugoslav feature-film makers could learn from them. Without having seen the shorts, one can agree that they need to learn from someone.

It is curious that a people who suffered so greatly should make such a synthetic, implausible picture about that suffering. Crudity one could forgive; without patronization, one might even expect it – the Yugoslavian film effort has never raised much expectation in the world. But to romanticize what must be scarred deep in the national soul, in a film photographed in the very streets where things like this happened, argues a kind of artistic bankruptcy, not naïveté. People who want to tell the truth may direct or act or edit badly, but to cram a tragic experience into a pastry-chef's mold requires either cynical, proficient commercialism (of which the film contains no corroborative evidence) or short-sighted dishonesty.

A Jewish girl is stranded when her parents are herded off to a camp, and to protect her, an "Aryan" youth marries her at the request of his parents, who are close friends of the girl's parents. It is a nominal marriage. (This must have happened often in Fortress Europa.) The boy is resentful because he likes another girl, but in time – after he sees how the Jewish girl suffers and how sweet she is – he falls in love with his wife. (This, too, presumably happened in some cases, but already life is beginning to imitate art.) At length the girl is imprisoned by the local Quislings. Our hero sets out to find her, and after a search which would have been difficult for a squad of detectives, let alone one youth, he comes fortuitously upon a clue that leads him to a camp where his wife is in the "Ninth Circle," the innermost area where young women are kept for the amusement of the staff. How he gets to her, manages to steal her from the group, makes love to her in hiding before they attempt to cross the barbed-wire fence, and how they die together on the wire gazing into each other's eyes – all this forms a finale which may impress those who are seeing, not their first Yugoslav film, but the first film of their lives.

A similar sentimentality, on a much higher technical level, is visible in *Fate of a Man*, a Soviet film which was produced and directed by its leading actor, Sergei Bondarchuk. Based on a Sholokov story, it tells in flashback of a soldier whose wife and children were killed by German bombs, who then is captured and becomes a slave laborer, and who after the war adopts a homeless child with whom he is now wandering the roads, seeking to build a new life. Again the basic elements are probably true and not uncommon, but the whole is so soaked in self-pity and so daubed with hokum that it estranges us instead of communicating. The overhead shot of the lines filing into the gas chambers is too symmetrical and choreographic; the scene in which the hero saves his life by amazing the camp commandant with his power to consume vodka is too much like a fake-Irish comedy. The unvarying stalwartness of the Russian prisoners and the hero's miraculous escape are other distortions in a picture that holds a faulty mirror up to nature.

The Russians have as much right as anyone else to make their *Guns of Navarone* films, but they ought to make them with a clear romancer's conscience, without pretense that they are uttering pronouncements about a people's wartime agony and the "fate of a man." There is a wide space between the two stools, and this film falls ponderously into it.

*Secrets of Women* is a nine-year-old Ingmar Bergman film in which he uses one of his favorite photographers (Gunnar Fischer, who later did *Wild Strawberries* and *The Magician*) and several of his company of players whose faces, if not names, are becoming happily familiar to us. The film consists of three stories, told by three wives, of turning points in their married lives, and in them are sketched ideas that Bergman later developed in *A Lesson in Love*, *Smiles of a Summer Night*, and *Brink of Life*.

The first episode deals with a young wife who has a brief, disappointing affair with a childhood sweetheart and whose husband's pseudo suicide-attempt, when he learns of this, may help to renovate their marriage. The second tells of a Swedish girl's garret love-affair in Paris with a young Swedish artist, his return to enter the family business, and her refusal (at first) to marry him when, learning that she is pregnant, he is afflicted with remorse. Both of these episodes are unfocussed and unsatisfactory. The first hints at a neurosis in the wife which no Sacha Guitry ending could cure; the second omits the very turning-point which it is supposed to dramatize – the reconciliation between the young pair. But the first has some subtle interplay between the lover and the wife, and the second is adroitly told. Bergman char-






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acterizes the girl without words. When she grabs a glass of water on her nighttable, she gulps it and drenches herself. When she drops the glass next to the bed and breaks it, she steps out next to it with bare feet. When she runs water in the basin, she carelessly allows it to flood over. All this is done *en passant*, without italics, and before the sequence is 90 seconds old, we know a good deal about the girl.

In the third episode, especially well played by Gunnar Björnstrand and Eva Dahlbeck, method and matter are matched and the result is delightful. A self-satisfied but not humorless tycoon and his loving but neglected wife are stranded overnight in a stalled elevator and, in the course of the night, provide themselves with an anatomy of their marriage. Promises are made in the suspended island which, of course, are broken when the castaways return. A cultural anthropologist might note that this is one more work on a theme that seems to have started with Ibsen. The theme states that women are wise and all-seeing, that men are merely clever children, and that, for their egos' sakes, their wives allow them to think they are dominant and deep.

It is interesting that almost all the works in this vein have been written by men. Pause, ladies, and consider: who is kidding whom?

STANLEY KAUFFMANN

## RECORDS

# *Some Voices from the Vault*

For many years the musical scholars contended that the music of a relatively few major composers of recent centuries that we heard was only a small part of the great music of the past. It did not, they said, include all the great works of even these major figures; it excluded some of their contemporaries who had used the same language and style with equal results; it ignored what had been produced in earlier centuries by men whose creative powers must be presumed to have been equal to those of the later composers. However, in the past ten years LP records have acquainted us with a large amount of this previously unknown music; and some of it has indeed proved to be music we had been the poorer for not knowing; but a great deal has turned out to be deserving of its previous obscurity. We have learned that not everything Beethoven or Haydn or Bach wrote was great; that some of Mozart's contemporaries used the language and style of his period but did not produce with them what he produced; and that the music of the 12th or 13th Century that presumably was esthetically satisfying to listeners of its period may not be esthetically satisfying to listeners of today.

Handel's dramatic ode *L'Allegro ed Il Penseroso*, of which many of us will get our first hearing from London OL-50195/6 (mono) and SOL-60025/6 (stereo), is a work we have been the poorer for not knowing; for the contrasts of mood and the imagery of Milton's poems stimulated Handel's musical imagination to a flow of superb invention in melody, harmony and orchestration. The performance offers effective pacing and shaping of the music by David Willcocks, especially lovely singing by the sopranos Jacqueline Delman and Elizabeth Harwood and the contralto Helen Watts, good singing also by the soprano Elsie Morison, the tenor Peter Pears and the bass Hervey Alan, and good work by the St. Anthony Singers and the London Philomusica, with Thurston Dart at the harpsichord and organ.

Unfamiliar too is some of the music on Columbia KL-5627 (mono), whose title, *The Consort of Musicke*, refers to the Elizabethan instrumental ensemble that performed alone and accompanied vocal pieces in the theater and elsewhere – an ensemble of six who played the treble lute, cittern, pandora, treble and bass viols, and either a flute or a recorder. Of the Consort Players who play them on the Columbia record, one, Blanche Winogron, also plays the virginals; and the singers are Helen Boatwright and Charlene Petersen, sopranos, Margaret Tobias, contralto, Aksel Schiotz, tenor, and Mack Harrell, baritone. There are pieces for the instrumental group alone, for one to five voices with one to six instruments, and for the virginals alone; and of these a couple are uninteresting, a few are moderately engaging, two – Morley's *Joyne Hands* and Conversi's *Sola soletta* – are charming, and several are outstanding: the anonymous *Those Eyes That Set My Fancie on a Fire*; Dowland's *Can She Excuse My Wrongs* and the instrumental galliard derived from it; his *Flow, My Tears* and the instrumental pavin derived from it; his *If My Complaints Could Passions Move* and the two galliards derived from it, one of them by Bull; and Peerson's *Pipers Paven*. In *Flow, My Tears* the deterioration of Schiotz's voice is evident and saddening; but the solo performances of Harrell, Boatwright and Winogron and the vocal and instrumental ensemble performances are excellent.

The Sacrae Symphoniae and Canzone

"SOUTH AFRICA, HAPPILY *forewarned of the proposed visit of Soapy Williams, took thought for its domestic tranquillity and informed the U. S. Government that it would be impossible, for the nonce, to make Mr. Williams comfortable during his stay. The U. S. Government, mistaking South African indifference for Communist intransigence, immediately invoked the Kennedy Doctrine and retreated. Now, suppose the U. S. Chamber of Commerce took the position that Soapy wasn't welcome here...?*"

From the current issue of NATIONAL REVIEW. Write to Dept. R-4, 150 E. 35 St., New York 16, N.Y., for free copy.

### NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS

Louis J. Halle, *formerly a member of the State Department Policy Planning Staff, is a professor at the Institute of Higher International Studies in Geneva.* Honor Tracy *is an Anglo-Irish writer best known for her novel,* The Straight and Narrow Path. Richmond Lattimore *is equally distinguished as a poet and as an editor-translator. He is a professor of Classics at Bryn Mawr.* Julian Mayfield *has published three novels. The newest is* The Grand Parade.



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of Gabrieli on Vanguard BG-611 and BGS-5037 offer additional beautiful examples of the writing that was heard on the earlier Vanguard record of works of Gabrieli, *Processional and Ceremonial Music.* The excellent Double Choir of the Gabrieli Festival sings this time under Gillesberger's direction, and with a group of brilliant-sounding modern brass instruments instead of the combination of modern and old instruments in the earlier performances; but Anton Heiller again provides the *intonazione* on the same delicate-toned organ.

To the moderate interest of the vocal pieces by Byrd on Experiences Anonymes 37 Russell Oberlin adds the charm of his attractive counter-tenor voice and his sensitive use of it, but the In Nomine Players don't do as much for the uninteresting instrumental pieces.

I find the peculiar timbre of Alfred Deller's counter-tenor less acceptable than before, and his inflection of it less impressive in Purcell's *The Queen's Epicedium* and Bach's *Bist du bei mir,* on the record *Deller's Choice,* Vanguard BG-612 and BGS-5038; but he is more effective in the pieces by Schuetz, Blow, Humfrey and others, which are quite good. Of the keyboard works of Locke, Frescobaldi and Froberger played by Gustav Leonhardt, I like only a Froberger Toccata.

And in Vivaldi's *Beatus Vir,* on Lyrichord 95, I find only a few sections interesting: the "Exortium est," "Jucundus homo" and "In memoria aeterna." The performance by the chorus and orchestra of the Stuttgart Academy and unfamiliar soloists under Grischkat's direction is adequate.

As for records of instrumental works, Angel 35877 and S-35877, with the familiar and charming Vivaldi *Four Seasons* beautifully performed by the Virtuosi di Roma, have given me more pleasure than Epic LC-3760 and BC-1119, with I Musici's beautiful performances of unfamiliar pieces – two moderately engaging concertos by Alessandro Scarlatti and Durante and two dull ones by Leo and Pergolesi.

London OL-50198 and SOL-60029 offer Mozart's Divertimentos K.247 and 251 – the first only moderately interesting, the second more so, with a lovely Andantino and charming Rondo. Good performances by the English Chamber Orchestra – including a superb oboist – under Colin Davis.

And London OL-50189 and SOL-60019 have Beethoven's Septet played by the four strings and three winds of the Melos Ensemble, including the extraordinary clarinetist De Peyer. The piece was a favorite of Toscanini, who played it with the larger number of strings he found necessary for satisfactory balance with the winds. And it is in fact more attractive as played by an NBC Symphony group under Toscanini on RCA Victor LM-1745 – not only because of the additional NBC strings, but because of the tonal beauty, the brilliant execution and the enlivening tempos and phrasing of the NBC performance.

B. H. HAGGIN




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## The Hemingway Profile

*Sirs:*

In your July 24 issue, you published an article on Ernest Hemingway by Irving Howe which included a few remarks about me that I regard as irresponsible, rather sordid, and absolutely wrong. He starts off with the assumption that for the past 20 years Hemingway publicly was "a tiresome man" and "a show-off" and as a writer was a self-parodist. Upon this shaky assumption he constructs a second assumption: that a Profile of Hemingway that I wrote for *The New Yorker* in 1950 was – supposedly because I described this "tiresome man" and "show-off" and self-parodist as he actually was – "a smear of vanity and petulance that only a journalistic Delilah would have put into print." Now, the crude word "smear" is defined by my dictionary as "an attempt to destroy the good reputation of another, especially by making false and exaggerated accusations." Did I make any false or exaggerated accusations, or any accusations at all, for that matter? If so, neither Hemingway, who read and approved the Profile before it was published, nor Mrs. Hemingway, who is a friend of mine, nor anyone else has ever pointed them out. Was there any attempt to destroy a good reputation? Here, I think, Mr. Howe has got me confused with himself. I did not in 1950, and I do not in 1961, feel as Mr. Howe does about Hemingway: I liked him exactly as he was; I did not think he was "a tiresome man" (I thought he was a fascinating and exhilarating man); I did not think he was "a show-off" (I thought he was marvelously exuberant and blessed with the spirit of fun); and I did not feel called upon, as Mr. Howe does, to pass final judgment on which of Hemingway's works were genuine and which were parody (I merely felt grateful for whatever joy his writing had given me). If Mr. Howe, feeling as he does about Hemingway, had, God forbid, written my article, it conceivably might have been, in his mind, an "attempt," however unsuccessful, to ruin Hemingway's reputation. Since I wrote the Profile, and not Mr. Howe, it was an attempt to record as precisely as possible just how Hemingway, who had the nerve to be like nobody else on earth, behaved when he was in action, just how he talked, how he sounded and looked; it was a loving portrait of a great and lovable man. As for the "vanity" and the "petulance," I don't know what Mr. Howe is talking about, and my guess is that if he would take the trouble to read the Profile today (I would guess, again, that he was trusting to an imperfect memory), *he* wouldn't know what he is talking about, either. And as for the "journalistic Delilah," my only comment is that when a man (like a woman) is at a loss for an idea he gets personal, and when the man is not a gentleman he calls a woman names.

While I'm at it, I wish to ask a question. Even if Mr. Howe were right when he claims about Hemingway that "most of his late work was bad," what entitles him to take such an injured, censorious tone about it? He sounds as if he thinks that Hemingway made a point of letting him, specifically, down in order to disport himself as, to quote Mr. Howe, "an African hunter, the connoisseur of bulls, women, and wars, the experience-dropper," whereas the fact is that Hemingway, who may not have known what Mr. Howe expected of him, was heroically and uncorruptedly and uncompromisingly occupied day after day with writing as hard as *he could* and as well as *he could* until the day he died. And when he was unable to write or was between books, he still did what *he could*, which was to live life to the full and then, with a generosity that was limitless and had nothing to do with showing off, to make his private experience public, so that everybody else, except possibly a few literary critics, could also have a wonderful time.

But I can grant Mr. Howe one thing: he is not the first person to misinterpret the Profile. After it appeared in 1950, there were, along with the admirers who turned up, a certain number of Mr. Howes, who wrote in to *The New Yorker* to complain. Evidently, they didn't like the way Hemingway talked. They didn't like his freedom. They didn't like his not taking himself



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seriously. They didn't like his wasting his time on going to boxing matches, going to the circus, talking to friends, going fishing, enjoying people, celebrating the finish of a book by splurging on caviar and champagne. They didn't like this and they didn't like that. In fact, they didn't like Hemingway to be Hemingway. They wanted him to be somebody else – probably themselves. So they came to the conclusion that either Hemingway had not been portrayed as he was, or that if he *was* that way I should have kept quiet about it. They, like the later Mr. Howe, attributed to me their own pious disapproval of Hemingway, and then berated me for it. Some of the more devastation-minded among them called the Profile "devastating." Several months after the Profile was published, Hemingway himself wrote me, "About our old piece; the hell with them. Think one of the 'devastating' things was that I drink a little in it and that makes them think I am a rummy. But of course if they (the devastate people) drank what we drink in that piece they would die or something. Then (I should not say it) there is a lot of jealousy around and because I have fun a lot of the time and am not really spooky and so far always get up when they count over me some people are jealous. They can't understand you being a serious writer and not be solemn." I can't improve on Hemingway's own statement of the case. I'll leave that to Mr. Howe.

*Lillian Ross*
*The New Yorker*

*Sirs:*

In "Hemingway: The Conquest of Panic" by Irving Howe, I found much that was wrong and unfair. Mr. Howe said, "Nothing more cruel has happened to an American writer than the Lillian Ross interview in the 1950 *New Yorker:* a smear of vanity and petulance that only a journalistic Delilah would have put into print." He misses the whole point, not only about a truly brilliant piece of reporting (which was not an interview, as he puts it, but a work of art) but about Hemingway, life and everything that matters. He ascribes to Miss Ross a state of feeling that seems to be his own. I have read the profile on Hemingway three or four times over the years. . . . The piece had a real feeling for the vitality and the fun of the man and for his feelings at that particular time, for the small and large details of his life as it was then, during two days. He had just written a book and he had come to New York, excited about the book, very glad to be alive, on his way to Europe. If in her description of Hemingway letting off steam, laughing, drinking, exclaiming, being happy and a little sad, feeling that he might be getting a sore throat, Mr. Howe found him to be ridiculous and tiresome (he seems to resent Hemingway for not conforming to his conception of a literary man) then it is Mr. Howe's problem, not Miss Ross's.

*Julian I. Mazor*
*New York, N.Y.*

## Breaking Up the CIA

*Sirs:*

I hope you will permit me to comment briefly on your story, "Breaking Up CIA" (June 19 and June 26). I do not believe that the facts published, or unpublished, place the burden of the fiasco on CIA or Allen Dulles. And I do not believe that one event, read in its worst light, should cause a blanket attack on an organization that thought up and carried out one of the most spectacular intelligence operations in history – the U-2 plane. There have been assets in the past in CIA's ledger and the mistake here was political – in not providing air support on the beach. Many people believe that if this had been provided, the invasion would have been successful.

What ought to be done is the creation of an intelligence organization whose headquarters are unknown. whose leaders are anonymous and whose actions do not make the newspapers.

*Laurence Levine*
*New York, N.Y.*

*In reply:*

*The New Republic* stressed in its discussion of a possible breakup of the CIA that "the CIA role in the Cuban disaster is not . . . solely responsible for the contemplated reforms. The White House has been careful not to single out CIA as the scapegoat."


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

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


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